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ABSTRACT 
Valerie Cooley:  Implementation and Effects  
of Graduated Sanctions for Juvenile Offenders 
(Under the guidance of Dennis K. Orthner, Ph.D.) 
 
 
Graduated sanctions are a key feature of state juvenile justice policy.  Federal funding 
to states is contingent upon use of graduated sanctions for juveniles.  Every state has adopted 
aspects of graduated sanctions models, yet limited information exists regarding the 
implementation or effectiveness of graduated sanctions as a policy intervention.  Nationally, 
approximately 90% of delinquent youth are supervised within their local communities, so a 
system of graduated sanctions depends upon local efforts to develop and sustain community-
based sanctions.   
North Carolina is one of many states that enacted juvenile justice reforms based upon 
a graduated sanctions model.  Using data from 93 counties, this study examined the 
implementation of community-based sanctions and the effects of sanctions continuums on 
county-level juvenile crime rates and custody rates.  The implementation analysis showed 
implementation variability.  Most counties did not implement a full continuum of sanctions 
as idealized by the state model.  Counties with fewer financial resources had lower 
implementation levels, but regression analysis revealed that political factors had the greatest 
effect on implementation.   
Counties were classified according to the overall level of sanctions.  A county-level 
longitudinal database was then constructed using data from 1990 to 2006 to include years 
before and after reform was enacted.  Variability in local sanctions continuums was used to 
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examine the effects of community-based sanctions on policy outcomes.  Selection effects 
were controlled using fixed effects models and propensity score matching.    
Greater availability of sanctions in local communities reduced juvenile crime.  
Community-based residential services had the strongest effect, reducing the crime rate by 7 
youth per 1,000.  Secure custody rates dropped by half following juvenile justice reform.  
Prior to reform, counties with fewer sanctions alternatives had higher custody rates despite 
lower crime rates..  Legislative mandates restricted the use of secure custody to the most 
serious offenders.  The decrease in custody rates for low implementation counties following 
reform may represent a forced departure from the practice of using secure custody for lack of 
sanctions alternatives.  Results of the study lend support to recent state policy efforts to 
strengthen community-based sanctions and create smaller, community-based residential 
programs in lieu of large secure facilities.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Historically, juvenile justice policy in the United States has reflected a debate 
between two seemingly contradictory strategies for addressing juvenile crime.  Policy has 
alternately emphasized either punitive sanctions to deter crime or rehabilitative approaches to 
encourage behavioral change  (Bernard, 1992).  State legislation of juvenile justice policy 
during the 1990s was dominated by a punitive framework (Butts & Mears, 2001; Jensen & 
Howard, 1998), largely in response to rising juvenile crime rates.  The shift was evident in 
more referrals for formal court processes compared to dismissals, increased use of secure 
custody, and an escalation in the use of determinate sentencing tools (Griffin, Torbet, & 
Szymanski, 1998).  Determinate sentencing tools structure decision-making processes about 
sanctions for juveniles by providing guidelines or mandates, usually based upon offense 
severity and risk factors for recidivism, that govern the decision regarding punishment.  Such 
schemes are intended to reduce bias in sentencing (Sarri et al., 2001), but they may also pose 
obstacles for individualized treatment of offenders, a key feature of the juvenile justice 
system historically.  State adoption of determinate sentencing for juveniles reflects the 
practice of the adult system.  Most prominently, the scope of laws that transfer youth from 
juvenile court to adult court expanded, subjecting them to formal criminal court proceedings 
(Griffin et al., 1998; Puzzanchera, 2003).      
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Despite the legislative policy shift toward punitive strategies in the 1990s, some 
researchers and juvenile justice professionals continued to argue for the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of a rehabilitative emphasis in juvenile justice.  Scott and Grisso (1998) and 
others (Grisso & Schwartz, 2000; Steinberg & Haskins, 2008) have emphasized 
developmental differences between adults and juveniles in decision-making capacity, 
suggesting that the use of similar punitive policies is inappropriate.  Intervention research has 
challenged the pervading belief that no interventions effectively reduce delinquency (Howell, 
2003).  Reviews of juvenile justice evaluations have identified many effective interventions 
based upon rehabilitative premises (Herrenkohl, Chung, & Catalano, 2004; Lipsey, 1999; 
Lipsey & Wilson, 1998; Loeber & Farrington, 1998).  Meta-analyses of program evaluations 
have found that rehabilitative programs can effectively reduce juvenile crime, especially 
when multiple services are provided in a noninstitutional setting over an extended period of 
time (Lipsey, 1992; Lipsey & Wilson, 1993).   
In addition, one study showed that public support for legislation emphasizing punitive 
approaches for juveniles was based upon misinformation and faulty assumptions  (Schiraldi 
& Soler, 1998).  A more recent study indicated that the general public favors rehabilitative as 
opposed to punitive strategies to address juvenile delinquency (Krisberg & Marchionne, 
2007).   
Accountability in Juvenile Justice 
In the midst of ongoing debate about the two seemingly contradictory goals of 
punishment and rehabilitation, a recent theoretical framework for juvenile justice known as 
balanced and restorative justice has emerged.  Balanced and restorative justice offers the 
hope of reconciliation between punitive and rehabilitative efforts to address juvenile crime.  
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The framework emphasizes the notion of accountability as a central tenet in justice policy 
(Bazemore & Clinton, 1997; Bazemore, Umbreit, Klein, Maloney, & Pranis, 1997).  
Accountability has been defined as the assurance of consequences for admitted or 
adjudicated offenses that prompts juveniles to take responsibility for the delinquent act 
(Griffin, 1999).  Some critics argue that accountability has simply become a euphemism for a 
punitive model of juvenile justice (Howell, 2003).  Proponents suggest, however, that it 
incorporates rehabilitative goals of competency development (Beyer, 2003; Matese, 1997) 
and reintegration with the community (Bazemore & Clinton, 1997; Bazemore et al., 1997) so 
that youth can become productive members of society.  In practice, accountability may be 
manifested in punitive approaches that emphasize consequences, but theoretically the 
concept holds the promise of merging two contrasting philosophies of juvenile justice. 
Within the framework of accountability, the use of immediate consequences may serve to 
incapacitate offenders who pose a risk to safety, deter further crime, increase awareness of 
the effects of one’s actions, and teach pro-social beliefs and skills (Griffin,1999; Matese, 
1997).   
Accountability is the underlying concept in the appropriations act that initiated the 
Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants program to provide federal funding to states 
utilizing graduated sanctions in juvenile justice (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Schools 
Act, 1998).  Federal legislation has adopted the language of accountability as a policy goal 
and as an intermediary step to facilitate reductions in juvenile crime (Consequences for 
Juvenile Offenders Act, 2002; Juvenile Crime Control Act, 1997; Twenty-first Century 
Justice Appropriations Act, 2002).  A federal administrative strategy to address juvenile 
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crime emphasizes both accountability, associated with immediate consequences for 
delinquent acts, and rehabilitation (Wilson & Howell, 1993). 
Federal Support for Graduated Sanctions 
In 1998, the federal government provided 250 million dollars in block grants to states 
who adopted accountability-based programs as a part of the juvenile justice system (Parent & 
Barnett, 2003).  Subsequent legislation continued to provide funding for states, though the 
allocation decreased in later years (Beyer, 2003).  A central tenet of the block grant 
legislation was state use of graduated sanctions to increase accountability of juvenile 
offenders.  Adoption of graduated sanctions was one of four federal requirements states had 
to meet to be eligible for funding.  The legislation defined graduated sanctions as a 
systematic range of sanctions, available to an offender for every offense committed, in which 
sanctions become progressively more severe with each subsequent offense.  Though the 
block grants could be used by states for a variety of funding priorities, almost three quarters 
of the funding was spent on developing or strengthening systems of graduated sanctions 
(Parent & Barnett, 2002). 
Graduated sanctions were emphasized in another key piece of federal juvenile justice 
legislation.  The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002 promoted the use 
of graduated sanctions as a strategy to reduce juvenile crime.  Title II, governing juvenile 
justice programs, and Title V, for local delinquency prevention programs, of the Act 
allocated federal funds for state juvenile justice systems.  These funding blocks provided the 
largest allocation of federal funding to state juvenile justice systems in recent years (L. 
Warner, personal communication, July 18, 2007).  Overall federal spending on juvenile 
  5 
 
 
justice has declined, so it is significant that the largest blocks of remaining federal funds 
specifically promote the use of graduated sanctions.  
The federal administration endorsed graduated sanctions as a key feature of an 
effective crime reduction strategy referred to as the Comprehensive Strategy for serious, 
violent, and chronic offenders (Wilson & Howell, 1993).  Subsequently, the Guide for 
Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy was developed to encourage and strengthen 
implementation efforts by states and local municipalities (Howell, 1995).  Two key 
components provide the foundation of the Comprehensive Strategy.  The first is a network of 
prevention and early intervention programs to prevent delinquency.  The other is a system of 
graduated sanctions, including rehabilitative treatment services, in order to halt the 
progression of offending behavior.   
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) provided funding 
to three initial pilot sites in 1996 to implement graduated sanctions as a part of the 
Comprehensive Strategy (Coolbaugh & Hansel, 2000).  Since that time, six states were 
selected as demonstsration states and received intensive training and technical assistance for 
implementation (Matese & Tuell, 1998).  The Juvenile Sanctions Center (2005) has also 
supported state and local adoption of graduated sanctions.  Fifteen demonstration sites have 
implemented and evaluated systems of graduated sanctions in order to determine effective 
policies and practices.  Several states have followed the blueprint of the Comprehensive 
Strategy in order to develop a continuum of graduated sanctions (Howell, 2003; Mondoro, 
Wight, & Tuell, 2001).   
 Systems of graduated sanctions have always been an aspect of the juvenile justice 
system, but in a somewhat rudimentary and unstructured format (Howell, 1995).  Federal 
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funding did not initiate this trend, but the federal financial incentives and administrative 
initiatives seem to have strengthened and institutionalized a trend already begun by states.  
Initial applications for Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants indicated that 77% of 
states already met the eligibility requirement for graduated sanctions.  Those that did not 
meet the criterion submitted a detailed plan to indicate changes to bring the state juvenile 
justice system into compliance (Parent & Barnett, 2003).  Every state has applied for and 
received funds from this program in every year it has continued (Development Services 
Group, 2002), indicating widespread adoption of graduated sanctions across states.     
Federal legislative and administrative initiatives emphasize the use of graduated 
sanctions as a key strategy for addressing juvenile crime.  Federal funding for juvenile justice 
promotes the utilization and every state has adopted some type of system of graduated 
sanctions.  This strategy is the predominant and underlying model for juvenile justice policy 
development.  Despite the prevalence, definitive conclusions about the effect of graduated 
sanctions as a systemic intervention have not been reached (Wiebush, 2002).   
This evaluation seeks to contribute to the existing literature and inform ongoing 
policy development efforts by providing empirical evidence regarding the implementation 
and effects of graduated sanctions in one state.  Using county-level data from North Carolina, 
the study examined the implementation of juvenile justice reform legislation that mandated 
the creation of county-based Juvenile Crime Prevention Councils (JCPCs) responsible for the 
development of community-based sanctions.  Reports from 93 of 100 counties provided 
information about the available and partially available services in county-based sanctions 
continuums that span multiple program types and supervisory levels.  Once counties were 
classified according to implementation level, information available to the public from the 
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North Carolina State Data Center was used to create a longitudinal database to examine the 
effects of community-based  sanctions on both juvenile crime rates and juvenile custody 
rates. 
The analysis was divided into three parts.  Chapter 2 describes the implementation 
analysis using cross-sectional data from the time period following the passage of juvenile 
justice reform.  In addition to the identification of county-level variability in community-
based sanctions, the chapter also includes results of regression analysis used to predict 
differences in implementation.  Chapter 3 reports the results of longitudinal analysis 
examining the effect of community-based sanctions on county-level juvenile crime rates 
while controlling for alternative explanations of crime.  Chapter 4 provides the results of a 
similar evaluation examining effects on juvenile custody rates.  Though both analyses 
utilized similar data for explanatory variables, different techniques were used to control for 
selection bias.  Each chapter provides some discussion of the analytical findings, but the final 
chapter offers a summary of the three analyses with a discussion of both study limitations 
and policy implications.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY-BASED SANCTIONS 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the federal government has financially and administratively 
supported state adoption and development of graduated sanctions for juvenile offenders.  All 
states utilize graduated sanctions for juveniles, including a comprehensive array of 
community-based sanctions and services available for juvenile offenders who demonstrate 
various levels of risk and need.  Only those juveniles with the most serious offenses, who 
pose the highest risk of re-offending, are sentenced to secure facilities typically managed by 
the state.  Most juveniles are placed in their communities and are subject to mandated 
sanctions and services provided by local government and social service agencies.  Local 
communities, therefore, have significant responsibility for developing and implementing 
graduated sanctions for juveniles.     
This study evaluated the implementation of community-based sanctions in 93 North 
Carolina counties.  State legislation mandated the development of local sanctions continuums 
for juvenile offenders.  An implementation evaluation of a policy helps assess the degree of 
convergence between intended services, often outlined by the state, and actual service 
provision dependent upon local government.  Attention to implementation also provides 
insight about variability across program sites and helps inform an impact evaluation (Rossi, 
Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004).  Following a brief description of the federal policy context, this 
chapter describes juvenile justice reform efforts in North Carolina, focusing on the state-local 
partnership that supports the development of community-based sanctions.  The purpose of 
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this study was to compare local implementation of sanctions with state-level legislative and 
administrative expectations regarding the law and to describe implementation variability 
across counties.  Using Matland’s (1995) ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation 
as a framework, the evaluation also identified factors affecting implementation at the local 
level.   
Sanctions Policy in Juvenile Justice 
Federal Support for Graduated Sanctions 
Legislatively, the federal government strengthened the state adoption and 
development of graduated sanctions for juveniles through financial incentives from the 
Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant program (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Schools Act, 1998; Parent & Barnett, 2003; Twenty-first Century Justice Appropriations Act, 
2002).  Administratively, the federal OJJDP endorsed the use of graduated sanctions as a key 
feature in an overall juvenile crime reduction strategy referred to as the Comprehensive 
Strategy for serious, chronic, and violent juveniles (Wilson & Howell, 1993).  In federal 
legislative and administrative documents, graduated sanctions are described as an array of 
sanctions, available for every offense, that are sure, immediate, consistent, individualized, 
and community-based.  Sanctions should escalate with subsequent and more serious offenses 
(Howell, 1995; Twenty-first Century Justice Appropriations Act, 2002).   
All states have accessed federal funds and established some form of graduated 
sanctions systems (Parent & Barnett, 2003).  Conceptual models of graduated sanctions 
emphasize a comprehensive array of sanctions across multiple levels of supervision as one 
key component (Howell, 1995; Wiebush, 2002).  Several states have followed the blueprint 
of the Comprehensive Strategy in order to develop sanctions continuums (Coolbaugh & 
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Hansel, 2000; Howell, 2003; Matese & Tuell, 1998; Mondoro, Wight, & Tuell, 2001).  State 
and local cooperation are important to ensure such comprehensiveness.  In order to more 
carefully examine the role of local communities, it is helpful to focus on juvenile sanctions 
policy in one state.   
North Carolina’s Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998 
Similar to efforts in many states, North Carolina passed comprehensive juvenile 
justice reform in the late 1990s (Juvenile Justice Reform Act, 1998; Mason, 1999).  The 
newly created North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(NC DJJDP) assumed responsibility for several substantial changes that took effect in July of 
1999.  Guided in part by the Comprehensive Strategy (Howell, 1995) and a graduated 
sanctions model developed by the Juvenile Sanctions Center (Wiebush, 2002), North 
Carolina reforms contained three graduated sanctions policy components—a decision-
making structure, information management, and a comprehensive array of services and 
sanctions.  The implementation of the components relies on efforts by both the state and local 
government.  
The new juvenile code included a disposition level matrix to guide the court in 
making disposition decisions about level of supervision based upon severity of current 
offense and risk of re-offending.  The use of validated risk and needs assessment tools were 
introduced to gather information and support decisions about specific sanctions or services 
within a supervisory level.  The assessments include questions about known risk factors for 
recidivism such as offense history, school behavior, peer involvement, substance use, and 
parental supervision.  Needs assessments ask additional questions about mental health and 
family issues.  The use of a dispositional grid and assessment tools are typical of sentencing 
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guidelines reforms in many states (Mears, 2002).  The mechanisms aid consistency in 
sentencing statewide while providing the opportunity to individualize particular sanctions 
and services for youth.  Though the information is gathered by court counselors employed by 
the NC DJJDP, actual sanctions decisions are made by district judges elected in non-partisan 
elections every four years.  
The grid and the assessments underlie the decision-making component of graduated 
sanctions.  The NC DJJDP also developed and manages a statewide information system on 
juvenile offenders to fulfill the second component of graduated sanctions policy.   The third 
component involves the development and oversight of an array of community-based services 
and sanctions.   
The Juvenile Justice Reform Act mandated the creation of local JCPCs in every 
county in North Carolina to assume responsibility for community-based sanctions.  
Legislation and subsequent administrative directives specified the composition of the council 
to include representatives from the juvenile courts, local law enforcement, human service 
providers, parents, and youth in each community (Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998; 
North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention [NC DJJDP], 
2006).  Each council is expected to meet regularly, assess the needs of the youth in the 
county, identify gaps in services, and provide a continuum of community-based services and 
sanctions at the local level in each county.  Council members receive aggregated information 
from the state about the risk levels and needs of youth in their particular county to help 
prioritize program needs and apply for available state funding.  JCPC consultants employed 
directly by the state juvenile justice agency oversee the assessment and service planning 
process.  Each consultant is responsible for specific counties within a geographic region. 
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The ideal continuum of sanctions and services spans multiple service program types 
and various supervisory levels for local youth.  Some programs are available for all youth in 
the community and others are targeted to at-risk or court-involved youth.  The funding 
sources for the programs are varied and may include state sources, private donations, and 
local school budgets.  Program areas include restorative services, such as restitution and 
community service.  Clinical and assessment services are provided by multiple private 
agencies to address mental health, substance abuse, and family therapy needs.  Structured 
activities may include a wide range of programs such as volunteer or non-profit organizations 
like Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, faith-based programs, mentoring, or sports activities.  
Community structured-day programs are typically either alternative schools or day reporting 
centers that provide supervision specifically for court-involved youth.  Residential programs 
include a few NC DJJDP programs specifically for juvenile offenders and private programs 
that also serve youth referred by families or other state agencies.  
The state is responsible for providing secure custody facilities for the highest level of 
supervision in the continuum of sanctions.  In North Carolina, only 14% of  adjudicated 
youth in the 2005-2006 fiscal year were confined to a secure facility at disposition.  The 
majority of delinquent youth in the state, as is true nationally, are served by community-
based sanctions.  Youth in secure facilities are returned to the community at release, so 
community services are also needed for them.  In order to receive any state funding for 
sanctions continuums through the NC DJJDP, the councils must document compliance with 
all state requirements in the form of an annual report.  Local counties have significant 
administrative and fiscal responsibility for the development and implementation of 
community-based sanctions in the state juvenile justice system.   
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Policy Implementation 
Policy Implementation in Criminal and Juvenile Justice 
In the past, the federal government showed concern about implementation of justice 
policy following a large influx of money into criminal justice policy innovations in the 1970s 
(Ellickson & Petersilia, 1983).  Disillusioned with seemingly ineffective innovations, policy 
makers wanted to examine ways to ensure successful implementation.  Criminology scholars 
also recognized the importance of implementation to identify the actual workings of 
proposed programs and policies, produce information about challenges to policy reform, and 
to correctly interpret evaluation results (Krisberg, 1980).  Since that time, scholars have 
examined implementation of law-enforcement strategies to address gangs (Winfree, Lynskey 
& Maupin, 1999), hate crime legislation (Haider-Markel, 2002), drug policy in California 
(Percival, 2004), and major crime reduction legislation in England and Wales (Maguire, 
2004).   Multiple factors were identified that influence implementation of criminal justice 
legislation including political climate, conflicting policy goals, multi-actor collaboration, 
tractability of the problem, funding, staff training, organizational capacity, and timeframes.  
Studies specific to the juvenile justice system have also focused on implementation.  
Holsinger and Latessa (1999) identified the levels in a state sanctions continuum and 
predictors of disposition decision-making.  The Criminal Justice Policy Council (2001) in 
Texas evaluated the implementation of juvenile justice reform legislation and provided 
information on the number of probation departments utilizing the sanctions continuum as a 
guide to sentencing.   These descriptive studies did not identify predictors of implementation.  
Evaluations of juvenile detention intake practices in Florida (Bazemore, 1993), intensive 
aftercare probation programs (Goodstein & Sontheimer, 1997), and violence prevention 
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programs (Goei, Meyer, & Roberto, 2003; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003) all indicated that 
implementation did not always occur as planned or expected.  These studies demonstrated the 
wide range of factors that may influence implementation including multi-actor cooperation, 
leadership and staff capacity, ideological norms of the implementers, staff continuity, and 
community support. 
Implementation evaluations may stand alone to help ensure the quality of programs 
and policies, but attention to implementation is also important as an adjunct to impact or 
outcome evaluations (Rossi et al., 2004).  Without full implementation, it is impossible to 
make definitive decisions about policy effectiveness (Corbett & Lennon, 2003).  A past study 
of an adolescent drug use intervention showed that levels of implementation affected youth 
outcomes (Pentz et al., 1990).  More recently, Mears and Kelly (2002) found that recidivism 
outcomes for juveniles were more related to the implementation variability across sites than 
individual characteristics of the offenders.  Burke and Pennell (2001) studied the 
implementation of the sanctions component of the Breaking Cycles program in San Diego 
and identified specific program components that contributed to its effectiveness.   
Criminologists have called for more attention to implementation in evaluations (Mears & 
Kelly, 2002).  Lemley (2001) particularly recommended the use of a policy implementation 
framework in implementation studies.  
Literature on Policy Implementation 
Implementation evaluations of juvenile justice policy can make beneficial use of the 
broader literature on policy implementation.  Policy scholars have reviewed the policy 
implementation literature of the last few decades and support the continued importance of 
implementation research (Matland, 1995; Palumbo & Calista, 1990; Saetren, 2005).   An 
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unresolved disconnect between policy intentions and policy implementation remains, which 
may be increasingly important to understand given the policy shift to the states (O’Toole, 
2000).   The broader literature on governance (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001) incorporates 
aspects of implementation research and is enlivening its study (Hill & Hupe, 2002)   These 
reviews acknowledge the contribution of both “top-down” theories that emphasize 
characteristics of policy design and bureaucrat compliance and “bottom-up” theories that 
emphasize the important role of local discretion by policy implementers.  Such acceptance, 
however, further adds to the excessive number of variables that have been found to influence 
policy implementation, making it difficult to study empirically.  
Efforts at synthesis provide theoretical frameworks in which to analyze policy 
implementation by suggesting groupings of variables expected to influence implementation.  
Winter (1990) suggested examining variables associated with phases or levels of policy 
development which he describes as characteristics of the policy formation process, 
organizational and interorganizational behavior, street-level behavior, and the response of the 
policy target group as well as societal changes that may affect the target group.  Goggin, 
Bowman, Lester, and O’Toole (1990) focused specifically on communication patterns 
between levels of government and organizational capacity that entails resources, degree of 
fragmentation, and training.  The governance literature also supports the use of multilevel 
theoretical models that include characteristics of the broader environment, clients, the key 
intervention, organizational structures, and key leaders or managers (Heinrich, Hill, & Lynn, 
2004).   
Although these frameworks are helpful, challenges still arise in trying to incorporate 
so many different variables in an empirical analysis.  Small sample sizes preclude the use of 
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every variable that may possibly affect implementation (O’Toole, 2000).   Many policy 
scholars agree, however, that implementation research needs to move toward theory 
validation using empirical methods (Goggin et al., 1990; Heinrich et al., 2004; Saetren, 
2005).  The conflict-ambiguity model of policy implementation (Matland, 1995) narrows the 
range of possible influences by suggesting that certain variables are most important within 
specific policy contexts.  
The Ambiguity-Conflict Model of Policy Implementation 
Matland (1995) proposed a method for choosing which sets of variables are most 
applicable to specific policy situations based upon characteristics of ambiguity and conflict.  
Policy ambiguity relates to the clarity of either the policy goals or means for achieving the 
goal.  Policy conflict characterizes the level of congruence among the various participants 
involved in policy implementation regarding both policy goals and means.  Based upon these 
two characteristics, Matland proposed four classifications of policy situations.  Different sets 
of variables are expected to influence implementation within each category.  Low policy 
ambiguity and low conflict reflect an administrative implementation model, which is largely 
dependent upon available local resources including funding and staffing.  Political 
implementation occurs in situations in which policy goals are clear, but the various actors 
prioritize contrasting goals or disagree about means for achieving them.  Given the low 
ambiguity but  high conflict in such situations, those with political power and leadership 
authority are likely to determine implementation outcomes.  Experimental implementation 
typically occurs in situations with high policy ambiguity but low policy conflict.  Such 
implementation is determined by the norms of local actors and available financial resources 
and usually results in high variability between sites.  Finally, symbolic implementation 
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occurs with high policy ambiguity and conflict.  Local coalition strength is expected to 
determine implementation outcomes.  
The ambiguity-conflict model has been used to examine policy implementation in 
areas of welfare policy, old growth forest management, and concurrency planning in Florida 
growth management policies.  The qualitative case study of forest management in Montana 
illustrated a political paradigm (Mortimer & McLeod, 2006).  The authors characterized the 
policy situation as such because of the two clearly defined but contrasting goals of harvesting 
versus preservation of the forests.  They examined administrative documents describing 
programs, court decisions, and administrative regulations and concluded that political 
strength had the greatest influence on implementation.  Chapin’s (2007) study of 66 local 
governments in Florida showed the extreme implementation variability expected in an 
experimental model of policy implementation.  A generally supportive political climate 
suggested low conflict, and local discretion for determining level-of-service standards and 
timing of implementation aligned with a characteristic of high ambiguity.   Using information 
from county websites, municipal reports, and interviews with planning department staff, 
Chapin found that local actors determined policy implementation.  The welfare study is a 
cross-state comparison using 44 states as the units of analysis; its results do not support 
expected predictors of implementation, which the authors attribute to the lack of certain 
variables in the analysis (Jennings, Jr.& Ewart, 2000).  The ambiguity-conflict model also 
provides a helpful framework to empirically examine implementation of community-based 
sanctions for juveniles.   
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Policy Implementation in North Carolina 
The relationship between the state and local implementers in North Carolina seems to 
align with Matland’s (1995) administrative model of policy implementation.  One central 
agency, the NC DJJDP, oversees the implementation of juvenile justice policy with clear 
legislative mandates and administrative policies that govern specific policy outputs as well as 
roles and responsibilities of those involved in implementation (Juvenile Justice Reform Act, 
1998; Mason, 1999; NC DJJDP, 2006).  Agency staff have shown a high compliance rate in 
all three components of graduated sanctions policy.  In decision-making, for example, only 
2% of youth involved in the state juvenile justice system in the years 2004-2005 were not 
assessed for risk of recidivism and needs.   
The NC DJJDP also oversees the activities of the county-based JCPCs that are given 
the specific responsibility for ensuring a locally-based continuum of services and sanctions.  
In order for counties to obtain funding from the state, the local councils must comply with 
specific procedures regarding composition of the council, frequency of meetings, assessment 
process, and reporting documents (NC DJJDP, 2006).  All councils filed the necessary 
reports and received funding from the state.  Although council members are not necessarily 
employees of the state juvenile justice agency, consultants employed by the state oversee all 
council activities.  Centralized authority, clear procedures, and high compliance within the 
North Carolina system suggest characteristics of low ambiguity as well as low policy conflict 
that constitute an administrative model of policy implementation (Matland, 1995).  As such, 
it was expected that local resources would have the greatest effect on county-level 
implementation outputs.  Since staffing patterns and training are related to funding, this 
analysis assessed the effect of local financial resources on implementation.   
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The state-local partnership in juvenile justice is organized such that local JCPCs have 
discretion to determine the most pressing needs of the county and adapt community sanctions 
accordingly.  Such discretion adds an element of policy ambiguity that may result in more 
variability between counties, as expected in an experimental paradigm of policy 
implementation.  In such a case, local resources would be expected to affect outcomes as 
similar to an administrative paradigm.  In addition, however, the belief systems of staff 
members might also influence implementation outcomes in an experimental policy situation.  
Despite high compliance with NC DJJDP mandates, the local councils are comprised of 
varied actors from different agencies.  Conflict may arise around the specific decisions 
regarding the programs that constitute the sanctions continuum.  An element of conflict may 
reflect Matland’s political model of implementation (1995), so it was important to consider 
political affiliation of leaders and the community in the analysis.   
Data and Model Specification 
Using cross-sectional county-level data from North Carolina, this study examined the 
variability of community-based sanctions continuums mandated by state juvenile justice 
reform.  Overall implementation levels and specific sanctions components were described 
and compared to a state-level model for the sanctions continuum.  The study also identified 
local factors that affected implementation, giving particular attention to local financial 
resources.   
Data and Sample 
Each of 100 counties in North Carolina has a JCPC that is required to conduct an 
assessment of available services within the county in a process entitled Continuum Building.1   
                                                 
1
 Two counties share one JCPC, so there are only 99 JCPCs in the state.  The council produces a report for each 
county it supervises, and this study used the county as the unit of analysis. 
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A JCPC consultant, employed by the NC DJJDP, oversees the assessment process in several 
counties within a given region.  A standardized annual report is produced by each council as 
the final result of the assessment process.  Assessment reports are available to the public and 
were obtained from the JCPC consultants.  Assessment reports for the planning years 2006-
2007 and 2007-2008, which represent the state of services at of the end of 2005 and 2006 
respectively, constituted the basis of the administrative data used in the implementation 
analysis.  These years were chosen due to the availability of data and to allow for a five-year 
period following the adoption of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act to give sufficient time for 
full implementation.   
The annual report provides information on all services available for juvenile 
offenders in the county across multiple levels of supervision.  In addition, each program is 
rated in regard to the availability and accessibility of services in the community.  Appendix A 
contains an example report.  This information was quantified to develop measures of 
implementation for use in data analysis.  Of 100 counties in the state, 93 provided assessment 
reports.  The remaining seven counties, from one of four geographic regions, did not provide 
reports despite repeated requests, due in part to a vacant JCPC consultant position.  In 
general, the seven counties are smaller and less densely populated than the average county.  
The sample of 93 counties, therefore, has higher means for these variables than the full 
sample of 100 counties would have had if implementation data were available.  The missing 
counties had a lower delinquency rate in 2004.  Slight differences exist in other demographic 
characteristics.  Appendix B lists the means for various socio-demographic variables for the 
sample, seven missing counties, and all counties in the state.  Study findings should only be 
tentatively generalized to the entire state.  
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A database was developed with additional county-level demographic, economic, and 
political variables.  All data are available to the public through the North Carolina State Data 
Center, which compiles information from various state and federal agencies.   
Implementation Measures   
The key outcome variable is a measure of overall implementation of the continuum of 
services and sanctions expected in each county.  Administrative data were converted into 
quantitative scores of implementation that reflect the comprehensiveness or completeness of 
the local continuum of sanctions.  Administrative reports describe services in six different 
program categories across five levels of supervision for offenders.  Two of the program 
types, assessment services and clinical services, were collapsed resulting in five program 
types which include structured activities, restorative services, clinical services, structured 
community day programs, and residential programs.  The first level of supervision, 
prevention services for at-risk youth, is not considered in this analysis as the focus of the 
evaluation is graduated sanctions for juvenile offenders.  In addition, the fourth level of 
supervision, secure confinement, is the responsibility of the state and is not considered in this 
analysis.  The three remaining levels represent immediate sanctions, intermediate sanctions, 
and aftercare services provided upon release from residential facilities.  Restorative services 
are not typically provided post-release, so the measurement of the completeness of the 
continuum is based upon fourteen components of the continuum that represent the expected 
five program types across three different levels of supervision excepting post-release 
restorative services.    
An overall implementation measure was created based on the sum of scores that 
designate whether particular services are fully available, partially available, or not available 
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in the county.  In addition, indicators of full availability of services are used for each of the 
five program types in order to assess variability in specific components of juvenile sanctions 
policy.   The first column of Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the implementation 
measures.   
Explanatory Variables and Statistical Model 
Based upon Matland’s model of policy implementation (1995), the implementation 
outcome was regressed on variables representing local financial resources and additional 
control variables.  All explanatory variables were for the year prior to the implementation 
year.  Counties with fewer financial resources were expected to have lower implementation 
levels.  Key explanatory variables included county revenue per capita, state funding 
designated for local sanctions continuums per youth, per capita income as an overall measure 
of county wealth, and population density to test whether rural counties have greater difficulty 
with implementation (Mears, 1998).  Rural counties were assumed to have access to fewer 
financial and in-kind resources.  Local school expenditures per pupil were used as a measure 
of local resources designated specifically for the youth population.  Finally, the state assesses 
the economic strength of a county and determines the required percent match in funding that 
each county must provide to obtain state funding for JCPCs.  The highest required match is 
30% and indicates greater economic strength.  The lowest required match is 10% and 
indicates the least amount of local resources.  Indicators of the match requirement were 
included as measures of overall economic strength.  Due to the lack of organizational level 
data about the JCPCs, this study will focus on the financial resources in each county.  Other 
measures of local resources, such as staffing capacity and training levels, are assumed to 
correspond to available funding levels. 
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Other juvenile justice evaluations have found that the ideological positions of key 
leaders (Bazemore, 1993; Goodstein & Sontheimer, 1997; Terry-McElrath & McBride, 
2004) and community support for interventions (Mihalic & Irwin, 2003) may affect 
implementation.  Past studies of crime policy have shown that Republicans, as compared to 
Democrats, tend to favor more punitive policies such as secure custody (Smith, 2004; Yates 
& Fording, 2005). In order to control for the level of support from the community and 
juvenile justice leaders, the percent of registered voters who are Democratic and an indicator 
of whether or not the District Attorney is Democratic were included in the model.  Counties 
with a Democratic majority of voters and a Democratic District Attorney may be more likely 
to support community-based sanctions and have higher implementation.  
Bottom-up policy formation involves local implementers who exercise discretion and 
alter policy to fit local needs (Brodkin, 1990; Palumbo & Calista, 1990).  In order to assess 
whether counties with higher levels of implementation are responding to the needs of local 
youth, the percentages of system-involved youth in each county with high and medium needs 
and high and medium risk of recidivism were included.  The state provides this information 
to counties for deliberate consideration in developing the sanctions continuum.  The 
delinquency rate was also included to see if implementation of sanctions is a response to 
crime.  The percentage of the county population between 10 and 17 was included as counties 
with a smaller youth population may not be expected to have as many services targeted 
toward youth.  Attitudes about crime and strategies for crime control sometimes vary based 
upon geographic region (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Krisberg, Litsky, & Schwartz, 1984; 
Mears, 2006), so indicators for three of the four regions in the state were included in the 
analysis.  Table 2.2 lists the descriptive statistics for all variables.   
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Methodology 
 Descriptive analysis was used initially to examine means and standard deviations of 
implementation scores across all counties.  Counties were then classified into categories of 
high and low resources based upon their position above or below the median score on three 
socioeconomic measures.  In addition, groups were developed based upon the state 
designation for the mandated match for state funds to JCPCs.  Population density was used 
separately to designate the counties as high or low density.  Bivariate analysis provided an 
initial assessment of whether or not financial resources affected implementation of 
community-based sanctions.  To assess differences in specific policy components, proportion 
tests were conducted to compare the groups in terms of full availability of specific services 
such as residential or clinical programs.  
Several preliminary steps were taken to specify the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression models used to identify predictors of implementation level.  Due to the likelihood 
of correlation within the groupings of explanatory variables, particularly the local resources 
measures of interest, initial analysis included Pearson correlations between explanatory 
variables and calculation of variability inflation factors (VIFs).  Per capita income, in 
particular, showed strong correlations with local school expenditures (r = .63) and population 
density (r = .70).  Though the VIF was not over 7, it was distinctly higher than the other 
variables which can suggest a problematic relationship between it and the other explanatory 
variables.  Its inclusion in preliminary models also reduced the goodness of fit of the model 
while adding very little additional explanation for variability.  It was not a statistically 
significant predictor of implementation.  Various transformations of the variable did not 
improve the models.  Various indices were developed to incorporate all the socioeconomic 
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variables into one measure, but they did not improve the models.  In addition, though 
correlated, many of the socioeconomic variables measure different aspects of county 
resources.  The state’s designation of the proportional match expected from the counties for 
the JCPCs is based upon multiple economic indicators and can represent an overall measure 
of economic strength.  The final analysis, therefore, excluded per capita income from the 
statistical models.  Percent of youth with high and medium risk of recidivism and high and 
medium needs were also highly correlated (r = .6), but did not have VIFs of concern.  The 
inclusion of both variables did not negatively affect the model fit or statistical significance of 
either variable in the models. Given the direct mandate to use the information in planning, it 
seemed important to include both variables as controls.   
The implementation data were gathered from two separate years.  An indicator 
variable was used to control for the effect of a greater time lag on the data collected for the 
2007-2008 implementation year.  It was not statistically significant in any model, so for 
simplicity the estimated coefficient is not reported.  The 93 counties in the sample are nested 
within 37 judicial districts, and autocorrelation likely exists between counties within one 
district.  The cluster sizes vary, including some districts comprised of only one county.  
Clustered robust standard errors were used to adjust the correlation matrices in order to 
ensure accurate standard errors.   Though multilevel models could also be used to address 
clustering effects, the relatively small number of clusters and the focus of the research guided 
the decision to use the more simple option of clustered robust standard errors.  Robust 
standard errors also corrected heteroskedasticity.  The groupings of variables were introduced 
into the regression in a stepwise fashion.  
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 In addition to the OLS regression models used to examine predictors of the extent of 
implementation, logistic regression was also used to analyze effects on implementation of 
particular continuum components.  The dichotomous indicators of full availability for each of 
the five different program types were used as the outcome variables in subsequent models.  
Control variables were the same.  The lag variable and clustered robust standard errors were 
used as in the OLS models.   
Results 
 Descriptive analysis showed that counties did not implement the full continuum of 
community-based sanctions.  Table 2.1 shows the mean scores on implementation measures 
for the full sample.  The mean on a scale from 0, for no services at all, to 28, for full 
availability of all programs at all levels, was 18.  Only one county had a perfect score with 
full implementation of all continuum components.  No others had full availability of services 
across even one supervisory level.  Variability did exist in the availability of services by 
program type.  Restorative services, which most commonly include teen court and restitution, 
were the most available services as 75% of counties had sufficient services for all youth.  
Assessment reports indicated that most of the restorative programs were funded by the state, 
so the additional support may explain the prevalence of the programs.  Only 16% of counties 
had full availability of residential programs.    
Bivariate Analysis 
Table 2.1 shows the mean implementation scores for the total sample and according 
to groups classified according to financial resources and population density.  In general, more 
densely populated counties and counties with greater financial resources had higher overall 
implementation scores, though the mean differences were not statistically significant.  The 
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counties required to make only a 10% match of state funds, indicating fewer economic 
resources, had a lower mean implementation score than either of the other two groups.   
The effects of population density or financial resources were not consistent when 
examining the availability of specific sanctions components.  These comparisons are also 
shown in Table 2.1.  Availability of structured activities did not vary much between counties.  
Most counties had multiple and diverse programs within this category, but the relatively low 
proportion of fully available services indicates they were insufficient for the needs of local 
youth or difficult to access.  A smaller proportion of highly densely populated counties had 
full availability of restorative services as compared to the low density group.  The small 
number of counties without restorative services and the small sample of high density counties 
may help explain the seeming contradiction.  The few counties without full availability in the 
high population density group tended to have a high number of services in that program 
category, but they were not all fully available.  More densely populated counties had greater 
availability of both clinical and residential services.  The difference between population 
density groups in available residential programs was statistically significant.  Similarly, the 
counties with higher financial resources also had significantly greater availability of 
residential programs.  Such programs are the most costly component of the sanctions 
continuum, so variation in local financial resources may have the greatest impact on 
residential programs. 
OLS Regression Results 
 Table 2.3 shows the results for the first and subsequent regression models.  A 
significance level of p < .10 was included because of the small sample size and the reduction 
in degrees of freedom due to the clustered robust estimation.  The initial model, using only 
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the financial resource variables to predict implementation level, indicated that only state 
funding for JCPCs had a statistically significant effect on implementation, but the effect was 
in the opposite direction than expected.  The effect was not substantively large.  The mean 
amount of JCPC funding per youth was 35 dollars with a standard deviation of 16.  A 32 
dollar per youth increase in funding, the difference between a county one standard deviation 
below and one above the mean, would decrease the implementation score by 1.  The change 
in score represents the loss of a partially available program or decreased availability of a 
program that had been fully available.  The indicator for counties with only a 10% match 
requirement was negative and significant at the p=.12 level, giving weak support to the 
notion that counties with fewer resources have lower implementation levels.  Population 
density had a positive effect on implementation at the p = .11 level; a result indicating that 
less densely populated counties may have access to fewer resources.  The F statistic was 
significant for the overall model, but only 11% of the variability was explained.  The low R2 
suggested that other factors were important to explain differences in implementation.  
 When the discretionary variables were introduced into the second model, as shown in 
Table 2.3, the model fit improved and additional variability was explained.  Population 
density became a significant and positive predictor of implementation.  Similar to results of 
the bivariate analysis, more densely populated counties had higher implementation levels.  
The effect of JCPC funding remained negative and significant with a slightly larger 
magnitude. The only discretionary variable that had an effect was the proportion of youth 
with high and medium risk of recidivism, but the sign was in the opposite direction of the 
expected relationship.  As the proportion of youth at risk of recidivism increased, the level of 
implementation decreased, but the change in the youth population had to be large for a 
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substantive effect.  A county with 20% more of the youth population at high or medium risk 
would have an estimated decrease of 1.2 points on the implementation score.  A lack of 
services could conceivably contribute to increased risk factors, but the risk data are from the 
year prior to implementation.  Other factors, especially unobservable influences such as 
attitudes about crime and crime control, could influence both.  A punitive stance toward 
juvenile justice may favor the use of secure custody rather than community-based services, 
especially in an area with a high proportion of youth at high risk of recidivism.    
The political variables had the biggest impact on implementation as seen in the third 
model of Table 2.3.  The overall model fit improved and explained an additional 10% of 
variability.  A Democratic District Attorney, a key leader in the local juvenile justice system, 
increased the implementation score by 3.5 points as compared to a Republican.  This result 
reflected the findings of studies that have shown Republicans tend to take a more punitive 
stance toward crime and may not be as supportive of community-based sanctions.  The 
relationship between JCPC funding and implementation level remained the same.   
Finally, the last model in Table 2.3 included dummy indicators for geographic areas 
of the state.  The variables served as controls for omitted or unobserved variables; attitudes 
about crime, for example, may differ by region (Mears, 2006; Terry-McElrath & McBride, 
2004).  Though none of the regional indicators had a significant effect on implementation, 
their inclusion explained an additional 20% of the variability in implementation score.  In the 
full model, JCPC funding and proportion of youth with a high or medium risk of recidivism 
had negative and significant effects on implementation.  Again, in order to see a substantive 
difference in implementation outcomes, the changes in population or funding would have to 
be large.  Population density had a positive effect on overall implementation.  More youth 
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with high and medium needs had a positive and significant effect on implementation, 
possibly reflecting the bottom-up argument that local implementers use discretion based 
upon local needs.  Slightly more than a 30% change in the youth population would be 
necessary to see a 1 point change in the sanctions continuum.  The effect of a Democratic 
District Attorney increased in magnitude.  Counties with Democratic leadership in the local 
juvenile justice system had, on average, an increase of 4.5 in the implementation score 
compared to counties with a Republican District Attorney.  Substantively, this reflects a 
difference of two fully available sanctions components such as clinical services and 
residential programs. . 
Interaction Effects 
Some additional analyses explored the possibility of interaction effects on overall 
implementation levels.  Specifically, interactions were included to test whether the influence 
of the Democratic District Attorney differed according to county characteristics.  A leader 
favorable toward the rehabilitative approach of community-based sanctions would likely 
have an even greater effect in counties with the resources to support the approach or in 
counties with the greatest needs.  Interactions with financial resource variables were not 
significant.  Inclusion of interactions between Democratic District Attorney and the youth 
risk and need variables, however, affected the results.  For example, the model that included 
the interaction of youth proportion at high and medium risk and Democratic District Attorney 
rendered the risk variable insignificant but the interaction was significant and negative.  The 
inclusion of the interaction also increased the positive effect of the District Attorney on 
implementation by 6 points, an increase that represents the addition of three fully available 
sanctions components.  Youth at highest risk of recidivism pose the greatest threat to public 
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safety and ideological responses may vary the most with this population of offenders.  Those 
are also the youth most likely to be removed from the community.  By specifically 
controlling for the interaction of the District Attorney and the proportion of youth at high and 
medium risk, the influence of a supportive leader may be even greater for the majority of 
youth who are served in the community.   
Regional interactions were introduced specifically with the discretionary variables 
related to local youth including youth crime rate and proportion of youth with high and 
medium risk and needs.  Such variables helped to assess whether regional differences 
represented attitudes regarding responses to juvenile delinquency and at-risk youth.   The 
introduction of the interactions did not affect many models.  The interaction of the west 
indicator and risk variable, however, was statistically significant and positive.  The 
magnitude of the negative risk coefficient that was found in all models was decreased 
specifically for the western region.    
Logistic Regression   
The logistic regression models showed some support for the effect of political 
variables.  Table 2.4 lists the models predicting likelihood of available sanctions components.  
The residential programs component was excluded from the table because the model only 
explained 17% of variability and was only statistically significant at the p < .05 level.  No 
variables were statistically significant predictors of available residential services.  Since only 
16% of counties have fully available residential services, this policy component had the least 
variability.  In general, the models predicting availability of a particular sanctions component 
did not explain as much of the variability as the models predicting overall sanctions 
implementation.  
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  The first model in Table 2.4 indicates that counties with a Democratic District 
Attorney and located in the eastern region are much more likely to have fully available 
structured activities.  In addition, an increase of 1% in the proportion of high and medium 
risk offenders decreases the likelihood of fully available services by 9%.  Except for the 
regional effect, this parallels the findings for overall implementation.  Counties in the east are 
more likely and counties in the central region are less likely to have fully available 
restorative services as shown in the second model.  The few counties with multiple 
restorative programs that are not fully available are mostly found in the central region and 
may help explain this finding.  Both clinical services and community structured day 
programs were much more likely, 15 and 28 times more likely respectively, to be fully 
available in counties with a Democratic District Attorney.    
When the models were run including the overall implementation score, it was a 
significant predictor in all models except clinical services and other variables became 
insignificant.  Variables used in this analysis to explain policy implementation may have a 
greater effect on overall implementation than the more specific planning involving different 
policy components.  Other factors not included in this analysis, such as organizational 
characteristics of the JCPCs or specific attitudes of personnel, may have a greater influence 
on particular implementation choices.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
 Despite clear legislation and a centralized Department of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention in North Carolina, the implementation of community-based 
sanctions for juveniles does not coincide with the idealized continuum of sanctions 
developed by the state.  This study of policy implementation confirmed other findings that 
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implementation of state policy does not always conform to expectations and is not uniform 
across local units of government (Bazemore, 1993; Goodstein & Sontheimer, 1997).   
Considerable variability existed in both the overall extent of implementation and the 
particular components of sanctions components.  This finding is significant in and of itself as 
a reminder that policy implementation is an important aspect of policy-making.  The state 
should continue to provide support to local communities to address gaps in services. 
Local Discretion in Implementation 
The variability in sanctions did not seem to be the result of discretionary choices by 
local councils to meet the particular needs of local youth.  Sanctions were not more extensive 
in counties with more youth or higher juvenile crime rates.  Proportion of youth at risk of 
recidivism did have a relationship with implementation level, but not in the hypothesized 
direction.  Though risk and needs data were explicitly provided for county consideration in 
the development of a sanctions continuum, higher levels of risk did not predict more services.   
In fact, a 10% decrease in the proportion of youth with a high or medium risk of recidivism 
increased the implementation score by a little more than half a point.  Given the high 
variability between counties in the proportion of high risk youth, this is an important finding.  
Initially, it might seem that a higher level of services decreased risk of recidivism, but the 
risk data were for the year prior to implementation.  If the overall availability of services in 
the sanctions continuum does not change over time, it is possible that lack of sanctions and 
services contributed to increased risk.  Implementation evaluations using longitudinal data 
would help to clarify this relationship, but it raises concern that implementation challenges 
may contribute to increased juvenile crime.  Another possible explanation is that counties 
with a higher proportion of youth at risk of recidivism are more likely to depend on secure 
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custody to address juvenile crime and not rely on community-based options.   Either 
explanation underscores the importance of state efforts to support the development and 
implementation of community-based sanctions.   
Political Factors in Implementation 
The conflict-ambiguity model of policy implementation (Matland, 1995) is a helpful 
paradigm for identifying the most likely factors to influence policy implementation.  The 
prediction that local resources would have the greatest effect on implementation of 
community-based sanctions was only weakly supported, and political influences showed the 
greatest effect.   The policy situation may be more correctly classified as a political or 
experimental model.  A model of political implementation arises in situations of high conflict 
and low ambiguity.  Despite one centralized authoritative agency and high levels of 
compliance within the NC DJJDP, crime in general is a politically contentious issue and may 
arouse conflict.  The conflict may be related to differences among local actors involved in the 
decision-making process rather than the state-local relationship.  On the other hand, the 
discretion granted to local councils contributes to a policy situation of high ambiguity.  In 
such a case, local resources and normative beliefs of implementers influence implementation.  
Though political party affiliation is a broad categorization for an ideological belief 
system, the large positive effect of a Democratic District Attorney suggests the important role 
of ideology and normative belief in the implementation of crime policy.  Though Democratic 
voters had an influence on implementation in one model, the persistent effect of a 
Democratic District Attorney in all models in the analysis seems to support the key role of 
local leaders in particular.  Other studies of juvenile justice programs have found that 
normative beliefs of both implementers and the community affect implementation outcomes 
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(Goei et al., 2003; Mihalic & Irwin, 2003; Terry-McElrath & McBride, 2004).  Democratic 
leadership increased the likelihood of residential and clinical services but not restorative 
services.  Such differences may reflect preferences for specific strategies to address juvenile 
crime.  Regional effects on the availability of particular sanctions components may also 
reflect attitudinal differences about appropriate responses to juvenile crime, and the findings 
lend tentative support to the idea that normative belief may influence implementation 
outcomes.  Other studies have shown Republicans tend to take a more punitive strategy 
toward crime (Smith, 2004; Yates & Fearing, 2005).  This study provides additional support 
by showing that Democratic leaders support rehabilitative, community-based sanctions 
options for juveniles.    
Further research assessing attitudes and beliefs of key juvenile justice leaders and 
members of the JCPCs would help illuminate whether normative beliefs are the mechanisms 
through which political affiliation and regional effects influence implementation outcomes.  
North Carolina has committed itself to using evidence-based practice within the juvenile 
justice system.  Validated risk and needs assessment tools, for example, are used to guide 
dispositional decision-making and service planning.  A research-based policy framework 
provides a point of reference to examine and discuss normative beliefs about effective 
juvenile justice practice.  Building consensus about appropriate strategies to address juvenile 
crime among council members, state juvenile justice staff, and the general public may help 
reduce conflict and improve the implementation of community-based sanctions in the state.   
Economic Resources and Implementation 
Political affiliation is related to many socioeconomic factors regarding class and race 
(Hutchings & Valentino, 2004), so local resources may have affected outcomes indirectly 
  39 
 
 
through political orientation of a community.  Additional models tested the mediating effects 
of socioeconomic variables and found that neither per capita income, child poverty, 
unemployment, nor welfare population were significant or altered the significance and 
magnitude of the political variables.  Additionally, demographic variables including median 
age and minority proportion did not mediate the effects of the political variables.  Bivariate 
analysis indicated a difference in implementation based upon county-level resources.  
Although political variables had a substantively larger effect on implementation, multivariate 
analysis showed some of the resource variables did affect implementation.    
State funding for JCPCs had a negative effect on overall implementation levels.  The 
data for JCPC funding were from the year prior to implementation data, but if 
implementation is static over time the relationship may be explained by greater funding 
going to counties who do not have existing services and sanctions.  Funding was specifically 
requested for targeted programs for the following year, so it seems more likely that funding 
affected implementation.  Greater state dollars may reduce incentives to provide local 
investment in sanctions.  Counties considered to have the greatest economic disadvantage 
were only required to produce a 10% match to state funding.  Those counties were less likely 
than the others to have full availability of community day programs.  Alternative schools are 
one of the programs within that category and these programs would require local support and 
financial commitment.  On the other hand, the counties with a 10% match were more likely 
to have restorative services which were typically funded by the state.  
Increased population density did increase the level of implementation, so the study 
findings coincided with other research demonstrating that rural counties had lower levels of 
implementation (Mears, 1998).  Less densely populated counties tended to have fewer 
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sanctions options, so it may be helpful to examine whether or not some funds should be 
targeted specifically to rural areas.  One limitation of this study is that it assumed an 
underlying relationship between funding and other resource variables such as staff training 
and organizational capacity.  Other more precise measures of resources may yield different 
results.     
The influence of financial resources on implementation is unclear.  To understand the 
relationship between state funding and local sanctions implementation, more specific 
information about funding is needed.  The formulas governing disbursement of funds from 
the state to the local level and the decision-making process regarding local distribution to 
particular programs may help illuminate the relationship.  Graduated sanctions models 
emphasize a wide spectrum of programs spanning multiple supervisory levels which may 
decrease the number of youth served by each program.  Such a strategy can be more costly.  
Regardless of the specific relationship between local resources and implementation, the state 
should facilitate consideration of efficiency in local service delivery.  Collaboration across 
counties or across agencies within a county, for example, may allow for a greater variety of 
programs at a lower cost.  Joint administration with multiple sites for program delivery may 
be another way to improve economies of scale.  Such strategies allow for multiple programs 
while promoting cost savings to ensure a sustainable commitment to community-based 
sanctions for juvenile offenders. 
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 Table 2.1  Description of sanctions implementation by socioeconomic indicators
Implementation variables 
Total   
(n=93)
High 
(n=13)
Low 
(n=80)
High  
(n=43)
Low  
(n=50)
30%  
(n=29)
20%   
(n=33) 
10%   
(n=31)
Level of implementation 
    Overall implementation score 18.10 18.92 17.96 18.48 17.97 18.03 18.73 17.48
    Full implementation score 5.43 6.00 5.34 5.74 5.33 5.28 5.61 5.39
Fully available sanctions components
    Structured activities 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.30 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.35
    Restorative services 0.75 0.46 ** 0.80 0.65 0.79 0.72 0.70 0.84
    Community structured day programs 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.14 0.40 0.23
    Clinical services 0.20 0.31 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.23
    Residential programs 0.16 0.39 * 0.13 0.30 * 0.11 0.24 0.18 0.06
aCounties with a population density over 300 are classified as high
bCounties above the median on three funding measures are classified as high
cHigher match requirement indicates greater SES resources according to state determination
**p<.01   *p<.05
Match requirement                  
for state fundingc Financial resourcesbPopulation densitya
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Table 2.2  Sample descriptive statistics
Variables (n=93) Mean SD
County revenue per capita (in thousands) 1.22 0.42
State funding for JCPCs per county youth 35.33 16.69
Local school expenditure per pupil (in thousands) 1.46 0.50
Indicator of counties with 30% match for JCPC dollars 0.31 0.47
Indicator of counties with 10% match for JCPC dollars 0.33 0.47
Per capita income (in thousands) 25.78 4.14
Population density 178.97 227.40
Percent of system-involved youth with high/med risk 50.05 13.94
Percent of system-involved youth with high/med needs 55.36 17.40
Delinquency rate 35.85 12.63
Youth proportion of population 10.69 1.10
Counties with Democratic District Attorney 0.75 0.43
Democratic proportion of registered voters 52.18 15.67
Counties in a family court jurisdiction 0.15 0.36
Public safety expenditures per capita 191.39 93.49
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2.3 OLS regression results predicting implementation score
Explanatory variables (n=93) Β SE Β SE Β SE Β SE
County revenue per capita (thousands) 1.15 1.33 0.58 1.25 1.14 1.14 0.27 0.73
State funding for JCPCs per county youth -0.03 † 0.02 -0.04 † 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 * 0.03
Local school expenditure/pupil (thousands) -1.66 1.08 -1.18 1.13 -1.01 1.30 -1.08 0.83
Indicator of counties with 30% match -1.24 0.95 -1.23 0.94 -1.13 0.82 -0.51 0.77
Indicator of counties with 10% match -1.10 0.69 -1.03 0.81 -0.90 0.91 -0.87 0.84
Population density 0.31 0.19 0.32 † 0.17 0.25 0.18 0.30 † 0.18
Percent of youth with high/medium risk -0.06 † 0.04 -0.07 * 0.03 -0.07 ** 0.03
Percent of youth with high/medium needs 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 † 0.02
Delinquency rate 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03
Youth proportion of population 0.18 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.72 0.45
Counties with Democratic District Attorney 3.50 * 1.40 4.56 *** 1.20
Democratic proportion of registered voters -0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.04
East 1.74 1.91
West 1.69 1.51
Central -2.83 1.93
F statistic 2.91 * 3.84 ** 4.51 *** 11.81 ***
R2 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.47
Note.  Though not reported, all models included an indicator variable signifying implementation data  
were from 2007-2008, indicating an additional year lag after implementation
Note.  All models were estimated using clustered robust standard errors 
†p<.10  * p< .05   **p<.0  ***p<.001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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 Table 2.4  Logistic regression results predicting availability of sanctions components
Explanatory variables (n=93) Β SE Β SE Β SE Β SE
County revenue per capita (thousands) 0.22 0.88 1.56 1.66 0.04 0.58 0.75 0.81
State funding for JCPCs per county youth -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Local school expenditure/pupil (thousands) -1.53 1.02 -0.71 0.96 -0.27 0.93 0.90 1.39
Indicator of counties with 30% match 0.94 0.84 1.52 1.43 -1.54 † 0.89 -3.08 1.91
Indicator of counties with 10% match -0.49 0.72 1.91 * 0.80 -1.14 † 0.69 1.19 1.15
Population density 0.18 0.12 -0.23 0.21 -0.07 0.16 0.14 0.12
Percent of youth with high/medium risk -0.09 * 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.03
Percent of youth with high/medium needs 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03
Delinquency rate 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.03
Youth proportion of population 0.23 0.42 0.33 0.40 0.62 0.52 -0.03 0.43
Counties with Democratic District Attorney 2.40 ** 0.92 -0.59 1.17 3.35 * 1.42 2.89 ** 1.12
Democratic proportion of registered voters -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.05 -0.11 * 0.04
East 3.07 ** 1.20 2.77 † 1.58 0.96 1.87 0.84 1.30
West 1.38 0.89 1.59 1.51 0.74 1.99 -0.71 1.45
Central 0.22 1.16 -2.85 † 1.6 -1.12 1.87 -0.51 1.50
Wald Chi square 64.07 *** 37.09 ** 41.91 *** 42.51 ***
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.37 0.24 0.31
Note.  Though not reported, all models included an indicator variable signifying implementation data  
were from 2007-2008, indicating an additional year lag after implementation
Note.  All models were estimated using clustered robust standard errors 
†p<.10  * p< .05   **p<.0  ***p<.001
Structured activities Restorative programs Day programs Clinical services
 
49
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
COMMUNITY-BASED SANCTIONS AND JUVENILE CRIME 
 
Though juvenile crime rates have been declining for a decade, a considerable 
proportion of American youth are still involved in delinquent activity.   Policymakers and 
practitioners in juvenile justice are continually seeking effective policies to prevent 
delinquency and reduce recidivism among juvenile offenders.  Since the 1990s, the use of 
community-based sanctions as a part of comprehensive crime control strategies has become a 
commonly adopted policy in state juvenile justice systems.  While a rudimentary system of 
graduated sanctions, including community-based programs, has always existed in juvenile 
justice systems, limited attention has been given to the systematic and precise utilization of 
sanctions (Howell, 1995).  Despite federal support and widespread adoption by states, 
insufficient information exists about the effectiveness of community-based sanctions as an 
element of juvenile justice policy intended to reduce juvenile crime (Wiebush, 2002).  The 
lack of empirical knowledge regarding the effectiveness of community sanctions is an 
obstacle to ensuring optimal state-level juvenile justice policies.  
North Carolina is one of many states that enacted juvenile justice reforms, including 
the adoption of community-based sanctions, during the 1990s.  The Juvenile Justice Reform 
Act of 1998 mandated changes that specifically govern the development of community-based 
continuums of services and sanctions in local areas.  Approximately 14% of juvenile 
offenders in the state are disposed to secure custody, so the majority of youth are served by 
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community programs.  Following a brief description of national and state-level policy 
regarding community-based sanctions, this study uses county-level longitudinal data to 
examine the effect of sanctions legislation on the juvenile crime rate in North Carolina.  
Juvenile Crime and Sanctions for Delinquency 
Juvenile Crime Trends 
Juvenile crime rates have declined since the mid 1990s.  Property crime dropped by 
half from 1994 to 2006.  The juvenile violent crime rate dropped 49% from 1994 to 2004 
with moderate increases in the two subsequent years (Snyder, 2008).  Despite the decline, 
legislators and the general public are still concerned about the level of delinquency.  The 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002 begins with the finding that, 
despite a declining trend in the juvenile violent crime rate, both the national level and rate of 
offending by juveniles is too high.  A recent report released by the National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency states that 90% of the voting public agrees that juvenile crime is still 
a serious problem (Krisberg & Marchionna, 2007). 
Self-report data from a national sample of high school students in 2007 revealed that 
35.5% of American youth indicated involvement in a physical fight that year.  Among high 
school students, 19.7% reported any marijuana use and 44.7% reported alcohol use within the 
last month (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008).  In 2006, 17% of arrests for 
violent offenses and 26% of arrests for property offenses involved youth under the age of 18.  
An estimated 2.2 million youth were arrested that year (Snyder, 2008)  While the decline in 
juvenile crime rates is encouraging, delinquency remains a widespread and serious social 
problem. 
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Shifts in the demographics of the juvenile offender population have also aroused 
concern among policymakers, researchers, and practitioners in juvenile justice.  The 
proportion of juveniles involved in the justice system who are female has increased (Siegel & 
Williams, 2003; Williams, Ayers, Van Dorn, & Arthur, 2004).  In 1990, 19.5% of 
delinquency cases involved females as compared to 27.4% in 2005 (Sickmund, Sladky & 
Kang, 2008).  Specifically, female arrest rates for simple assault, larceny, vandalism, and 
weapons possession have increased over time despite declines in the overall juvenile crime 
rate for those offenses (Williams et al., 2004; Zahn, Hawkins, Chiancone, & Whitworth, 
2008).  In addition, the proportion of young offenders involved in the justice system has 
garnered attention.  The peak age of onset for delinquency has decreased from past years 
(Williams et al., 2004).  Children who engage in delinquent behavior at an early age are at 
greater risk of becoming chronic or serious offenders than youth with a later onset of 
delinquent behavior (Loeber & Farrington, 1998; Loeber, Farrington, & Petechuk, 2003).  
Racial disparities in juvenile arrests and confinement persist and raise concerns about 
possible bias and inequity.  Though African-Americans constituted 17% of the overall youth 
population in 2006, the racial sub-group was involved in 51% of all juvenile arrests for 
violent crimes and 31% of juvenile arrests for property crimes (Snyder, 2008).   
Juvenile delinquency often has long-term effects that also concern policymakers.  
Youth in the juvenile justice system are more likely than youth in the general population to 
be from poor families and have health and mental health problems. They have higher rates of 
school non-completion and unemployment than youth in general (Foster & Gifford, 2004), 
which may contribute to continued cycles of poverty.  Delinquent youth have a higher chance 
of developing anti-social associations as adults, which contributes both directly and indirectly 
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to increased risk of crime as adults (Simons, Stewart, Gordon, Conger, & Elder, 2002).   
Involvement in the juvenile justice system may negatively affect the transition to adulthood 
and increases the likelihood of continued social problems (Furstenberg, Rumbaut, & 
Setterson, 2004; Hogan & Astone, 1986; Krohn, Lizotte, & Perez, 1997; Mouw, 2004).   The 
increased likelihood of negative consequences in adulthood adds weight to concerns about 
the current level of delinquent behavior in our country.  
 The large number of youth involved in delinquent behavior, the changing 
demographics of the delinquent population, persistent racial disparities, and the long-term 
consequences of delinquent behavior warrant diligent efforts to improve policies to reduce 
juvenile crime.  A policy trend beginning in the 1990s emphasizes state adoption of 
graduated sanctions in juvenile justice systems.  Administrative efforts have relied upon a 
theoretical framework rooted in developmental theories of delinquency in order to develop 
models of graduated sanctions (Wilson & Howell, 1993).  Policy evaluations, however, have 
provided limited empirical information about the impact of graduated sanctions as a state 
policy intervention.  
Community-Based Sanctions as Policy  
Federal legislative and administrative initiatives define graduated sanctions as an 
array of sanctions, available for every offense, that are sure, immediate, individualized, and 
community-based.  Sanctions escalate with subsequent and more serious offenses 
(Consequences for Offenders Act, 2002; Wilson & Howell, 1993). The administrative model 
of graduated sanctions emphasizes the importance of a wide array of punitive sanctions and 
treatment options which span escalating levels of structure and supervision necessary to 
provide individualized services to juvenile offenders (Howell, 1995).  Nationwide in 2005, 
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only 11% of juveniles with delinquency petitions were placed into residential facilities 
(Sickmund et al., 2008).  Because most youth remain in local communities for supervision, 
community-based sanctions function as a key component within graduated sanctions policy.   
Legislatively, the federal government has strengthened the state adoption and 
development of graduated sanctions through financial incentives to states that implement 
such a policy for juveniles (Griffin, 1999; Parent & Barnett, 2003).  Eligibility for funds is 
based upon specific federal conditions, including the development and implementation of a 
system of graduated sanctions.  Every state has applied for and received funds from the 
federal Juvenile Accountability Block Grant program in every year since it began in 1998 
(Development Services Group, 2002).  The extent of financial awards indicates that all states 
have adopted a system of graduated sanctions.  Although block grant funds could be used by 
states for a variety of funding priorities, an implementation evaluation indicated that almost 
three quarters of the funding had been spent on developing or strengthening systems of 
graduated sanctions (Parent & Barnett, 2002).  
 Administratively, the federal government endorsed the use of graduated sanctions as 
a key feature in an overall juvenile crime reduction strategy called the Comprehensive 
Strategy for serious, chronic, and violent juveniles (Wilson & Howell, 1993).  Federally 
funded pilot sites in various states and counties have followed the model of graduated 
sanctions from the Comprehensive Strategy (Coolbaugh & Hansel, 2000; Juvenile Sanctions 
Center, 2005; Matese & Tuell, 1998).  The model emphasizes three policy components.  One 
relates to decision-making, another to information management, and the third to the broad 
array of sanctions and treatment options that include community-based programs (Howell, 
1995; Wiebush, 2002).  This study specifically examined the sanctions continuum 
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component of graduated sanctions in one state.  Several states, including North Carolina, 
have followed the blueprint of the Comprehensive Strategy in order to develop a continuum 
of graduated sanctions (Howell, 2003; Mondoro, Wight, & Tuell, 2001).  
Federal administrative and legislative efforts that support graduated sanctions are 
intended to increase juvenile accountability, defined as the assurance of consequences for 
delinquent acts, which facilitates a decline in delinquent behavior.  Legislation governing the 
Juvenile Accountability Block Grant  program indicates that the purpose of the funding is to 
help states address juvenile crime (Consequences for Offenders Act, 2002) .  The 
Comprehensive Strategy clearly identifies juvenile accountability as an expected benefit of 
graduated sanctions, and further specifies that accountability for juveniles is expected to 
decrease the likelihood of further or more serious crime (Howell, 1995). The use of 
graduated sanctions as policy may serve multiple goals, but reduction in juvenile crime is 
emphasized as a primary policy outcome.  Despite federal support and widespread adoption 
by states, limited information exists about the effectiveness of graduated sanctions to reduce 
juvenile crime (Wiebush, 2002). 
Evaluations of Graduated Sanctions 
Evaluations of Effective Programs 
During the initial development process of the Comprehensive Strategy, researchers at 
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency conducted a thorough review of effective 
graduated sanctions programs.  They were able to identify numerous programs that showed a 
decrease in future arrests or delinquent complaints for youth in the intervention groups as 
compared to youth in the control groups (Howell, Krisberg, Hawkins, & Wilson, 1995).  
Examples of effective programs included structured intensive day treatment, home-based 
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monitoring and multiple-service programs, diversion with one-on-one behavioral 
interventions, multi-systemic therapy, and intensive supervision with case management and 
monitoring.  Insights from the exhaustive review of individual studies, coupled with meta-
analyses (Garrett, 1985; Lipsey & Wilson, 1993; Lipsey, 1992), identified general and 
consistent characteristics of effective programs.  Programs that demonstrated a decline in 
delinquent behavior tended to include multiple services, involved frequent contact over a 
long duration of time, operated outside the formal juvenile justice system, and focused on 
youth strengths rather than deficiencies.  
 Other reviews have also identified effective programs to slow or stop the progression 
of offending behavior.  Increasingly, research is supporting the use of rehabilitative programs 
to effectively halt the progression of delinquent behavior.  Skills-focused programs such as 
anger management and social competence programs or gang resistance trainings have 
reduced further offending (Altschuler & Armstrong, 1984; Herrenkohl, Chung, & Catalano, 
2004; Lipsey, 1999; Lipsey & Wilson, 1998; Loeber & Farrington, 1998).  Research has 
provided information about the effectiveness of particular programs within a given sanction 
level and offered guidance about specific programs that should constitute a continuum of 
services.  Program evaluations have not, however, examined the effects of graduated 
sanctions as a system or policy intervention.    
Evaluations of Sanctions Continuums and Collaborative Interventions 
Before the formalized use of graduated sanctions as policy began with the 
Comprehensive Strategy, some past evaluations examined the effects of sanctions 
continuums. The focus was on the array of services provided, rather than one particular 
program.  Studies of states which have emphasized community-based services rather than 
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institutional correctional interventions may also provide insight into the effects of 
community-based sanctions.  Howell (1995, 2003) provides a review of these studies.  For 
example, studies of Massachusetts and Utah before and after de-institutionalization showed 
that youth involved in the system after the shift toward community-based alternatives had 
lower recidivism rates (Coates, Miller,& Ohlin, 1978) and showed declines in the incidence 
and severity of delinquent behavior (Krisberg, Austin, Joe, & Steele,1988; Krisberg, Austin, 
& Steele; 1989).  Burke and Pennell (2001) studied the effects of the graduated sanctions 
component of the Breaking Cycles program in San Diego by comparing a random sample of 
cases served by traditional probation prior to the onset of the program with a sample of cases 
served by the Breaking Cycles program.  They found that the intervention group was less 
likely to be referred or adjudicated for federal offenses than the comparison group.    
Other studies of the use of sanctions continuums in the Midwest (Holsinger & 
Latessa, 1999) and Texas (Criminal Justice Policy Council, 2001) were descriptive and did 
not examine the effect of sanctions on juvenile crime.  More recently, an evaluation of the 
Repeat Offender Prevention Program in Los Angeles compared outcomes of juveniles 
randomly assigned to either regular probation or an intervention group involved in an inter-
agency collaborative program with access to a comprehensive array of community-based 
services (Zhang & Zhang, 2005).  Of the 327 who started the study, 106 youth in the 
intervention group and 98 on regular probation successfully completed the program.  The 
offenders in the intervention group received more services than those on regular probation 
and showed improved educational outcomes including more days in attendance, more classes 
passed, and higher grade point averages.  Youth in the intervention group were less likely to 
have a new offense in the first six months, but no effect persisted after that time period.  A 
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California study of all 58 counties in the state evaluated the effects of grant funding for 
community-based collaborative programs in juvenile justice on various juvenile crime 
indices (Worrall, 2004).  Grants were competitively awarded based on counties’ 
collaborative plans to address juvenile crime, so selection bias was likely.  A fixed effects 
regression model, using longitudinal data from 1990 to 2001, was used to help address 
selection bias arising from unobserved variables that may have influenced the likelihood of a 
financial award and influenced the outcome variables.  No overall reductions in juvenile 
crime resulted from funding, but some of the 14 funded counties experienced decreases in 
crime rates.  The study did not examine the effect of specific sanctions or programs but 
utilized funding levels as an overall measure of collaborative programming efforts. 
  Several studies of graduated sanctions have been conducted in relation to drug 
testing.  Two different studies of almost 2,000 young parolees from the California Youth 
Authority examined the impact of drug testing coupled with graduated sanctions.   The 
offenders were randomly assigned to different levels of supervision.  One study showed no 
difference in future arrests for youth subject to different frequencies of drug testing 
(Haapanen & Britton, 2002).  Despite a spectrum of escalating sanctions for violations, the 
implementation evaluation suggested that most sanctions for a failed test were not varied and 
most offenders simply continued on probation.  The lack of effect on re-arrests may be due to 
a failure to actually implement graduated sanctions.  A second evaluation using the same 
cohort showed that those offenders assigned to greater drug testing coupled with graduated 
sanctions were less likely to be unemployed than those who were tested less often (Kilmer, 
2008).  Randomized experiments assigning adult offenders to drug testing with or without 
graduated sanctions have shown reductions in drug use (Harrell & Roman, 2001), self-
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reported re-offending, and official re-arrests (Mitchell & Harrell, 2006) for offenders subject 
to a combination of graduated sanctions and drug testing.   
Numerous reviews and meta-analyses of juvenile justice program evaluations guided 
the development of graduated sanctions models in juvenile justice.  Fewer empirical studies 
have been conducted on the effects of graduated sanctions policy.  Most of the research has 
involved program-level evaluations rather than examining the impact of graduated sanctions 
as a policy-level intervention.  Some studies focused on a very specific subpopulation of 
offenders or local counties.  Comprehensive Strategy evaluations like the study of the 
Breaking Cycles program may have examined multiple components of graduated sanctions 
policy simultaneously and obscured the effect of sanctions continuums.  Given the 
widespread use of graduated sanctions as state policy, it is important to build on prior 
research to refine and improve the use of graduated sanctions as a strategy to reduce juvenile 
crime.  This evaluation contributes to the existing literature by providing a county-level 
policy outcome evaluation that focuses specifically on the sanctions continuum component of 
graduated sanctions.  The study may also provide insight more broadly into the impact of 
collaborative efforts in juvenile justice, an area lacking much empirical study (Worrall, 
2004).   
Research Questions and Design 
Two characteristics of sanctions continuums seem especially important to facilitate 
behavioral change in juvenile offenders.  Though graduated sanctions reflect both federal and 
state policy initiatives, most juveniles are served within the local community.  Nationally, 
approximately 11% of youth are placed in secure or residential facilities and the rest are 
supervised at home (Sickmund et al., 2008).  Elmore (1980) has stressed the importance of 
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conducting outcome evaluations at the point where policy implementation actually addresses 
the behavior targeted for intervention.  The availability of sanctions and services within the 
local community is an important policy characteristic.  
In addition, many of the descriptive characteristics of graduated sanctions rely upon 
an assumption of comprehensiveness in the array of services.  It is impossible to intervene 
with immediate sanctions, for example, if they are not accessible.  Individualized case plans 
are hindered by a limited scope of available programs.  Gaps in services may preclude the 
effective triggering of rehabilitative processes to facilitate behavioral change, so the 
comprehensiveness of the sanctions continuum is another important policy characteristic.  
Using North Carolina as a case study, this evaluation used the variability across counties to 
assess juvenile justice reform legislation mandating community-based sanctions.  
Specifically, the effect of the overall comprehensiveness of sanctions on county-level 
juvenile crime rates was estimated.  In addition, this study assessed the relative effects of 
particular components of the sanctions continuum on crime rates. 
Data 
Implementation Data and Sample 
 County-based JCPCs are responsible for the sanctions continuum provided to 
juveniles in each North Carolina county.  Annually, each JCPC is required to conduct an 
assessment of available services within the county and provide a standardized annual report.  
A JCPC consultant, employed by the North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and 
Prevention, oversees the assessment process in each county.  The assessment reports from 93 
counties from the planning years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 constituted the basis of the data 
used to construct measures of continuum comprehensiveness and examine the effects of 
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policy at variable levels of implementation post-reform.  These years were chosen due to the 
availability of reliable data and to allow for a five-year period following the adoption of the 
Juvenile Justice Reform Act to facilitate full implementation.  The reports are available to the 
public and were acquired from the JCPC consultants.  
 Though there are 100 counties in North Carolina, data were only obtained from 93 
counties.  The seven remaining counties were the responsibility of one JCPC consultant, but 
the position was vacant and repeated requests for information from the regional office were 
unsuccessful.  Omitted counties are adjacent to one another and located in a specific 
geographical region outside a major metropolitan area.  The sample, therefore, does not 
accurately reflect the state as a whole.  The evaluation provides a clear description of what 
has actually happened following juvenile justice reform in most of the state and offers useful 
information to state legislators and juvenile justice professionals.  Generalizations to the 
whole state and other states should be cautiously considered.     
Once the policy intervention variables were constructed, a panel was developed using 
data for the outcome and control variables from the years 1990 through 2006 to allow 
sufficient time before and after the reform legislation passed in 1998 and was enacted in 
1999.  The outcome variable was the county-level juvenile arrest rate.  County arrest counts 
were obtained from the North Carolina Department of Justice through the North Carolina 
State Data Center.  Additional economic and demographic data used as control variables are 
available to the public from several federal and state agencies through the North Carolina 
State Data Center.  The longitudinal data from 17 time periods and 93 counties yielded a total 
sample of 1,581 observations. 
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Policy Intervention and Outcome Variables   
The JCPC reports provided information on all services available for juvenile 
offenders in the county as compared to a model continuum of five program types (structured 
activities, restorative programs, community day programming, clinical and assessment 
services, and residential programs) across multiple supervisory levels.   In addition, each 
program was rated in regard to its availability and accessibility in the community.  
Measurement of the comprehensiveness of the continuum was based upon an additive sum of 
fourteen cells of the continuum that represent the five program types across three different 
levels of supervision (immediate, intermediate, and post-release) except post-release 
restorative programs.  For an overall comprehensiveness score, each sanctions component 
was scored as a 2 for fully available, 1 for partially available, or 0 for not available; the index 
ranged from 0 for no services at all to 28 for fully available services in all program types at 
all supervisory levels.  An increase of 1 in the index suggested that a county had an 
additional sanctions component or had made an existing partially available service fully 
available.  In addition, indicator variables were utilized to represent whether each of the five 
program types within the sanctions continuum was fully available in the county or not.  An 
additive sum of these component indicators represented an overall measure of fully available 
services.  Table 3.1 lists the descriptive statistics for the sample of 93 North Carolina 
counties on various measures of sanctions comprehensiveness. 
The sanctions comprehensiveness score devised from the JCPC reports was used as 
the policy intervention variable in this evaluation.  Sanctions component indicator variables 
were used for additional analyses.  An indicator variable was used to represent the period of 
time following the passage of reform legislation that mandated the creation of county JCPCs 
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to develop and oversee sanctions continuums.  The interaction between the time variable and 
the policy variable isolated the effect of increased comprehensiveness in the sanctions 
continuum following reform.  The interaction of the program indicator variables with the 
time variable represented the average treatment effect of that particular component of the 
sanctions continuum.   
The county-level juvenile crime rate was the key outcome variable.  The total number 
of juvenile arrests (arrest of anyone age 17 and under) was divided by the number of youth 
age 10 to 17 in the county and multiplied by 1,000 to construct a juvenile crime rate measure.  
An alternative measure was utilized in some statistical models.  Youth in North Carolina fall 
under the jurisdiction of the adult court when they turn 16, so the initial measure may have 
included criminal activity committed by youth not subject to juvenile justice interventions.  
Conversely, some older youth could have been exposed to community-based sanctions earlier 
in their criminal career.  Some have an extended commitment to the custody of the juvenile 
justice department and may be subject to juvenile sanctions up to the age of 21.  Given the 
difficulty of distinguishing the actual group exposed to the policy intervention, two measures 
were used in the analysis.  The first crime rate was based upon arrests and population of 
youth under 18.  The second juvenile crime measure was discounted by the proportion of the 
youth population aged 16 or 17 for each county in a given year.   
For both juvenile crime measures, 28 observations were recoded after information 
about reporting coverage, overall trend, and general level of crime was verified in the Easy 
access to juvenile FBI arrest statistics dataset provided by the OJJDP  (Puzzanchera, Adams, 
Snyder, & Kang, 2007).  Using the North Carolina data, recoding was based upon the within-
county mean for the two time periods closest to the recoded observation.  The indicator 
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variable signifying that an observation included a recoded measure was not significant in any 
analyses.  Analysis using listwise deletion of the observations that were recoded did not yield 
different results in terms of significance, direction, or magnitude of coefficients.  Five 
remaining observations were missing data about juvenile arrests, so those observations were 
excluded from analysis.  The state juvenile crime trend corresponds to the national decline in 
juvenile crime over time as shown in Figure 3.1.  State data indicated that the average 
juvenile arrest rate prior to 1999 was 50 arrests per 1,000 youth as compared to 47 in the 
post-reform period.  The difference was not statistically significant.  
Alternative Explanations for Juvenile Crime  
 This evaluation was based upon a multivariate regression model that examined the 
effect of sanctions comprehensiveness on juvenile crime rates over time.  In order to isolate 
the effect of the policy intervention, it was important to control for other possible influences 
on the juvenile crime rate.  Economic theory of crime predicts that personal propensities, the 
return on illegal activities, and the return on legal activities affect criminal behavior (Becker, 
1968; Levitt, 1998).  Unemployment rates, poverty rates, and a measure of urban or rural 
setting have been used to control for returns on legitimate activities (Gius, 1999).  This study 
included the annual unemployment rate, per capita income, and population density as 
measures.  Social disorganization theory also purports that unemployment and poverty may 
increase crime and additionally includes residential instability as a contextual risk factor that 
increases the likelihood of crime (Shaw & McKay, 1969; Veysey & Messner, 1999; Vowell 
& Howell, 1998).  Accordingly, the percentage of owner-occupied homes in the county was 
included.   
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Justice policy initiatives intended to address juvenile crime rates needed to be 
considered.  North Carolina has instituted family courts as a way to coordinate individualized 
services to juveniles and families involved in delinquency or other child-related court 
matters.  Several judicial districts have adopted this model over the time period of the study.  
The model included an indicator of whether or not a county falls within a family court 
jurisdiction2 and public safety expenditures per capita as a measure of law enforcement 
activity.  Minority proportion and adolescent proportion in each county were used as 
demographic controls, a common practice in economic models that have used age or race as 
proxies for various propensities or tastes (Guis, 1999; Levitt, 1998).  Finally, in order to 
control for omitted or unobservable factors that may affect criminal behavior, the overall 
county crime rate was included (Levitt, 1998).  Annual total arrests were divided by the 
annual county population and multiplied by 1,000.  As with the juvenile crime measure, 
some overall crime rate variables were recoded using similar methods.  Nine observations 
were missing data for overall crime rate.  Due to the missing data in both juvenile and overall 
crime rates, the analytical sample was comprised of 1,572 observations.  Table 3.2 lists 
means and standard deviations for all variables in the analytical sample in both the pre and 
post reform periods.  
Methodology 
Several methodological challenges arose in this evaluation.  A key issue in this 
analysis was the likely presence of selection bias.  Since randomization is difficult in juvenile 
justice intervention evaluations (Zhang & Zhang, 2005), quasi-experimental designs are often 
used that may include the potential for selection bias (Harrell & Mitchell, 2006; Papachristos, 
                                                 
2
 This information was not obtained from the North Carolina State Data Center but directly from the website of 
the North Carolina Administration of the Courts at 
http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/CPrograms/Family/Default.asp 
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Meares, & Fagan, 2007).  Such bias occurs when determinants of the key explanatory factor 
are also affecting the outcome variable (Vella, 1998).  In this evaluation, the county JCPCs 
have discretion and responsibility to develop the sanctions continuums, so the 
comprehensiveness level of sanctions is endogenous.  Policy implementation literature 
suggests that local economic resources are likely to affect the extent of implementation 
(Corbett & Lennon, 2003;  Matland, 1995).  Risk and resilience research and social 
disorganization theory indicate that neighborhood poverty is a risk factor for delinquency 
(Hawkins et al., 1998; Herrenkohl et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2004; Veysey & Messner, 
1999; Vowell & Howell, 1998).  County-level socioeconomic indicators were likely to 
influence both the policy intervention variable and outcome variable.    
Using data from the pre-reform period only, bivariate analysis revealed differences 
between counties that had higher and lower degrees of comprehensiveness.  In particular, the 
counties with the most comprehensiveness in sanctions had higher juvenile crime and overall 
crime rates.  In addition, counties with the highest degree of comprehensiveness were the 
most densely populated.  Table 3.3 lists the county-level comparative descriptive statistics for 
the pre-reform period according to the degree of comprehensiveness in the sanctions 
continuum.  The comprehensiveness score was most highly correlated with the crime 
variables and population density and had Pearson correlation coefficients of .15 with juvenile 
crime, .08 with overall crime, and .20 with population density.  When the comprehensiveness 
score was regressed on the other factors, both overall and juvenile crime rates had a 
significant effect on the comprehensiveness score.  Inclusion of county fixed effects, 
however, rendered all of the other variables statistically insignificant.   Attention to selection 
effects was clearly important.  
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Careful model specification, including control variables for observed factors that may 
affect the relationship between the outcome and the explanatory variable, can address 
potential selection bias (Mitchell & Harrell, 2006; Vella, 1998).  The inclusion of variables 
guided by both economic and social disorganization theory helped to control the effects of 
socioeconomic factors that may influence both policy endogeneity and juvenile crime.  The 
primary concern, however, was that unobserved factors affected both the predictor and 
outcome variables (Frees, 2004; Vella, 1998).  Attitudes toward crime, for example, could 
have affected both justice policy implementation and delinquency rates in the present study.   
 Many extensions of Heckman’s strategy to model the selection mechanism and 
correct standard errors have been applied to various model types (Heckman & Navarro-
Lozano, 2004; Heckman, Tobia, & Vytacil, 2003; Heckman & Viytacil, 1998; Woolridge, 
1995).  The juvenile crime rate is a continuous variable, so an instrumental variables 
approach would be appropriate in this study.  Attempts to model the selection effect using 
socioeconomic variables as instruments resulted in very poor models.  Though the Wald chi 
squares were statistically significant, less than 2% of the variability in sanctions 
comprehensiveness scores was explained.  Given the challenges of adequately modeling a 
selection effect, this analysis relied upon the use of county-level fixed effects to capture 
unobserved variables that may have influenced both policy choice and juvenile crime 
(Hedeker & Gibbons, 2006).  An F test for joint significance showed that the county 
indicator variables did significantly contribute to the effect on the juvenile crime rate.  In 
addition, the overall crime rate served as a proxy for unobserved factors such as attitudes 
about crime that may have affected the explanatory variables and the outcome variable, 
inducing selection bias.  
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Crime data tend to have a strong serial trend so models were run using two different 
strategies to address serial correlation.  Indicator variables to signify the year were used in 
some analyses and a time trend variable and its square were included in other models (Singer 
& Willett, 2003; Woolridge, 2003).  An F test for joint significance showed that the time 
indicators were jointly significant.  In all models, the time trend variables were statistically 
significant.  A square of the time trend variable was used as the effect of the trend decreased 
over the years.  For simplicity, estimates are only reported for models using the time trend 
variables.  Panel data typically involve autocorrelation of variables within a given unit over 
time which leads to inaccurate estimates of standard errors.  Clustered robust standard errors 
were used to adjust the correlation matrices in order to ensure accurate standard errors and 
strengthen inference.  
Results 
Effects of Comprehensive Sanctions Continuums  
 Analysis proceeded initially with the overall sanctions comprehensiveness measure as 
the only policy intervention variable.  Table 3.4 lists the results of the first model.  When 
other influences were controlled, a greater degree of comprehensiveness in the sanctions 
continuum did decrease the juvenile arrest rate.  During the post-reform period, the addition 
of one fully available sanctions component (an increase of 2 points) in the continuum 
decreased the arrest rate by 1.5 juveniles out of 1,000 youth in the county population.  The 
statistically significant and positive coefficient for continuum comprehensiveness revealed a 
.5 difference in juvenile crime rate between high and low implementation counties in the pre-
reform period, an indication of potential selection bias.  The only factors that were not 
statistically significant were the unemployment rate and the minority proportion of the 
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county population.  Most of the coefficients were in the expected direction, though an 
increase in per capita income showed an increase in juvenile crime.  Notably, counties in a 
district with a family court had lower crime rates by 10 juvenile arrests per 1,000 youth in the 
population.   
The next model in Table 3.4 included the time trend variables.  The primary treatment 
effect of the sanctions continuum remained statistically significant with little change in the 
magnitude of the effect.  Per capita income was no longer significant which suggests that its 
effect was due in part to its serial pattern.  Inclusion of county-level fixed effects in the third 
model rendered the pre-reform difference in continuum comprehensiveness insignificant, so 
the fixed effects may have effectively captured some of the unobservable differences that 
contributed to both implementation level and juvenile crime.  The interaction term for 
sanctions comprehensiveness post-reform remained statistically significant, but the 
magnitude decreased slightly.  Several control variables became insignificant.  Family courts 
and the adult crime rate continued to show an influence on juvenile crime rates, though the 
magnitude of each effect decreased with the inclusion of county-level fixed effects.   The 
overall model explained approximately 16% more of the variability in sanctions 
comprehensiveness than models without the fixed effects.  The inclusion of fixed effects 
showed that either omitted or unobserved variables, such as attitudes about crime, seemed to 
have an effect on crime rates.  The adult crime rate was also included as a proxy to capture 
unobserved variables that may have induced selection bias.  When the model was run without 
that variable, the pre-reform difference in implementation was greater than with the inclusion 
of the adult crime rate.  In addition, the adult crime rate variable accounted for 5% of the 
variability in crime rates, giving further indication that unobservable differences may be 
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influencing both implementation levels and crime rates.  The fixed effects model and the 
adult crime rate as a proxy for unobservable factors controlled for the problem of policy 
endogeneity, thus giving greater confidence in the estimated effect of sanctions 
comprehensiveness.  Estimation using clustered robust standard errors changed the 
significance level of the overall treatment effect to p =.17 and the family court to p=.10, but 
the overall crime rate, which captured unobserved variables such as attitudes about crime, 
remained significant.  These results are reported in the fourth model of Table 3.4.     
The reported estimates are based upon models which utilized the juvenile crime 
measure for the 18 and under population.  Analyses using the discounted measure that 
excluded 16 and 17 year olds yielded similar results in terms of the significance and direction 
of effects.  Compared to the results listed in model 3 of Table 3.4, only the pre-reform 
difference in comprehensiveness level was no longer significant.  Table 3.3 shows the 
differences in crime levels pre-reform according to comprehensiveness level, and it seems 
possible that the differences were due in part to the criminal activity of the older youth 
population.  The magnitude of the effects for sanctions comprehensiveness post-reform, 
owner-occupied proportion of homes, overall crime rate, and family court all decreased.  
Because family courts only serve youth up to age 15, the decreased coefficient reflects a 
more accurate estimate of the effect on the population most likely subject to the intervention.  
Similarly, if the sanctions continuums primarily serve the youth population under 16 due to 
the age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction, the estimated effect would be smaller than the 
effect using the total youth population.   
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Effects of Sanctions Components 
 In order to examine the particular effects of sanctions components, models were then 
tested that each included one policy component indicator both with and without the overall 
comprehensiveness measure as shown in Table 3.5.  The interactions of the component 
indicators with the post reform indicator showed the average treatment effects of the 
sanctions components in the post-reform period.  All reported results in Table 3.5 refer to this 
interaction term though the component indicators were included in the models as well as all 
of the control variables and time trend variables.  Component indicators are time invariant, so 
they would be perfectly correlated with county fixed-effects.  As such, county indicators 
were not included in any of the analyses that involved the sanctions components, so effects of 
potential selection bias may not have been adequately controlled.   
Availability of residential services clearly had the greatest impact on juvenile crime. 
Only 16% of counties had sufficient residential programs to meet the needs of county youth.  
Community-based residential programs included a mix of specialized foster care, emergency 
shelters, multipurpose group homes, programs specific for juvenile offenders, and a limited 
number of residential mental health programs.  The residential services indicator was the 
only component variable that had a statistically significant effect on juvenile crime and 
reduced juvenile crime by about 7 youth per 1,000.  When overall sanctions 
comprehensiveness was included, the effect of residential services was reduced to 5 juvenile 
arrests per 1,000 at the p= .06 level.  The effect of the overall comprehensiveness score was 
also reduced (compared to the models in Table 3.4 with no component indicators) and 
became statistically significant only at p= .11.   
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The final two models of Table 3.5 list the results for the models run with all sanctions 
component indicators.  Residential services had the only statistically significant effect on 
juvenile crime.  The effect persisted using clustered robust standard errors.  Availability of 
residential services partially mediated the effect of overall comprehensiveness in sanctions.    
Other sanctions components seemed to have an effect largely through their contribution to 
overall comprehensiveness in sanctions.  In the models with only one sanctions component 
indicator, the coefficients were decreased when overall comprehensiveness was included in 
the models.   
Though not reported in Table 3.5, the effect of other control variables remained 
basically the same in the models including sanctions components indicators.  Without the 
inclusion of the overall comprehensiveness level, all of the variables except per capita 
income had a statistically significant effect on juvenile crime.  In each of the models with the 
overall comprehensiveness variable, most of the control variables lost significance except for 
family court, population density, the overall crime rate, and the time trend variables.  In the 
final model of Table 3.5 with all policy variables included, family courts decreased the crime 
rate while an increase in population density and overall crime increased the juvenile crime 
rate.     
Discussion and Policy Implications 
Limitations of the Study 
Attention to policy implementation was an underlying foundation of this study.  The 
nature of the policy variables posed both strengths and weaknesses.  The key policy variables 
reflected differential implementation of community-based sanctions.  Such variability 
provided an opportunity to study the effects of various levels and components of the policy 
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intervention when a comparison group without community-sanctions was not available.  
Detailed information about county-level sanctions continuums also facilitated the 
identification of particular components of policy that had the greatest effect.  The variability, 
however, reflected county discretionary choices and introduced complications of selection 
bias.  In policy research, a tension exists between dealing with the endogenity of policy 
choice and assumptions of uniformity in policy implementation.  Inclusion of socioeconomic 
factors expected to influence both policy choice and juvenile crime rates, the use of county 
fixed-effects, and an overall crime rate variable as a proxy for unobserved factors that affect 
crime helped to address potential selection bias in this study.  These strategies did not change 
the direction or statistical significance of the sanctions comprehensiveness effect.  Other 
methods to address endogeneity may yield different results.   
Challenges and benefits of using longitudinal data were also present in this study.   
Controlling for differences between counties before juvenile justice reform gave greater 
confidence in the differences post-reform.  A greater time span increased the number of 
observations for analysis but introduced complications of both trending variables and 
autocorrelation within counties.  Inclusion of time trend variables in this analysis did not 
change the effects of the policy variables.  Clustered robust standard errors to account for the 
autocorrelation of observations within one county changed the statistical significance of 
overall comprehensiveness to p = .17 in the models without any policy components.  Using 
the same approach, the effect of residential services in the full model with all variables was 
statistically significant at the p = .12 level and p < .05 when overall sanctions was excluded.   
An increase of observations in the sample with additional years or the remaining seven 
counties could induce a statistically significant effect.   
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The methodological challenges largely affected the estimation of standard errors and 
reduced confidence in inference.  Though the total population of counties was not used in this 
analysis and limits generalization, the sample included the large majority of the state.  The 
number of counties and corresponding observations represents a departure from case studies 
that examine just a few counties at a time.  As an evaluation of effects of North Carolina 
legislation in 93 counties, the study clearly showed that reform efforts governing the 
development of sanctions continuums helped to reduce juvenile arrests rates in most of the 
state.  The study results provide empirical support for recent juvenile justice initiatives.  
Lessons for North Carolina may offer more tentative principles to other states.    
Policy Implications 
The results from this study seem to indicate that a wide variety of available programs 
that constitute a larger sanctions continuum does help reduce juvenile crime rates.  Meta-
analyses of other juvenile justice evaluations have shown that interventions with multiple 
services, offered outside of the formal justice system and based on individual strengths and 
weakness of offenders, effectively decrease juvenile crime (Garrett, 1985; Lipsey, 1992; 
Lipsey & Wilson, 1993).  Graduated sanctions policy that guides and promotes adequate 
provision of multiple services in the local community aligns with these principles of effective 
intervention.  Overall comprehensiveness of the sanctions continuum, as compared to most of 
the individual sanctions components, had a greater effect on juvenile crime.  This finding 
suggests that the availability of a variety of services is perhaps as important as any one 
particular component.  Prior research has emphasized the importance of interventions that 
recognize and adapt to individual strengths and weaknesses of juvenile offenders (Lipsey & 
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Wilson, 1998).  A limited range of sanctions precludes individualized service planning for 
youth.    
The North Carolina legislature recently required a continuation review to determine 
whether or not to continue funding the JCPCs.  Other mechanisms are possible to coordinate 
and provide services, but the county-based councils represent an effective collaborative 
strategy to develop a sanctions continuum that relies upon multiple agencies.  This research 
supports the decision of the legislature to continue funding the JCPCs in order to strengthen 
community-based sanctions as a key strategy in juvenile justice policy.  This study did not 
attempt to explain why or how comprehensiveness affects behavioral change.  It seems likely 
that comprehensive sanctions alone cannot bring about a decrease in crime but provides a 
foundation to facilitate such change.  The process that matches individual needs and 
appropriate services depends upon the availability of such services.  The significant, 
substantive, and negative effect of family courts, which are designed to improve 
collaboration of services and individualized treatment-planning for juveniles, on juvenile 
crime rates suggests that the service-planning process may be a key mechanism to match 
needs and services.  The collaborative function of the JCPCs can similarly help with both the 
provision and matching of services.  Further research into the relationships between 
dispositional decision-making for juveniles and the availability of services may strengthen 
our understanding of how sanctions continuums address juvenile crime.    
Community-based residential services clearly constitute an important component of 
graduated sanctions policy.  The effect of available residential services remained strong even 
when controlling for the overall level of sanctions.  Two counties with the same overall level 
of services that differed only in the availability of residential services had a difference of 
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about 7 juvenile arrests per 1,000 in the county.  The average county youth population in this 
study was a little more than 8,000, so the average county with fully available residential 
services could see a large drop in the juvenile crime rate.  The large, more densely populated 
counties may especially benefit from ensuring adequate availability of community-based 
residential programs.  Such programs cost more than other community-based programs, so it 
may be important to specifically examine the cost-effectiveness of residential programs as 
compared to other options.  The findings from this study, however, provide empirical support 
for the state’s recent initiative to deinstitutionalize the state Youth Development Centers 
(North Carolina’s secure custody option for juvenile offenders) and develop smaller 
community-based residential programs.  Such a diversion of funding may provide benefits in 
terms of decreased juvenile crime without a large increase in costs.   
Similar to many other states, North Carolina has pursued juvenile justice reforms that 
emphasize the use of community-based sanctions.  This study validates those efforts by 
showing that comprehensive continuums of sanctions in local communities do reduce 
juvenile crime.  Residential services, in particular, seem to have a strong effect.  Continued 
research can further inform policy choices by examining the cost-effectiveness of various 
sanctions components and the mechanisms used to match community sanctions to the needs 
of individual juvenile offenders.  Findings from this study, however, support state efforts to 
develop and utilize community-based sanctions as a key strategy to address juvenile crime.   
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Variables (n=93 counties) Mean
Degree of comprehensiveness (means)  
    Overall comprehensiveness score  (0-28) 18.10
    Full availability of sanctions components (0-14) 5.43
Indicators of full availability  (proportions)
    Structured activities 0.38
    Restorative services 0.75
    Community day programs 0.26
    Clinical services 0.20
    Residential programs 0.16
Table 3.1  Description of county sanctions continuums 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics before and after juvenile justice reform    
              
Variables    Mean SD    Mean SD    Mean SD
Juvenile arrest rate per 1,000 youth 50.10 34.92 47.30 31.01 49.00 33.40
Overall arrest rate per 1,000 people 59.84 30.05 54.07 28.13 57.48 29.40
Per capita income (in thousands) 19.01 4.01 24.77 5.01 21.36 5.28
Population density 153.53 183.21 178.08 223.95 163.57 201.17
Annual unemployment rate 5.50 2.56 5.95 2.12 5.68 2.40
Proportion of homes owner-occupied 62.32 8.11 62.68 7.71 62.47 7.95
Minority proportion of population 24.36 17.46 24.60 17.76 24.46 17.58
Youth proportion of population 10.60 1.08 10.69 1.08 10.64 1.08
Family court (indicator variable) 0.01 0.11 0.05
Public safety expenditures per capita 105.23 56.59 166.64 70.10 130.39 69.37
Pre-reform Post-reform Total
(n=929) (n= 643) (n=1572)
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 Very low 
(<15)
Low        
(15-18)
High       
(19-21)
 Very high 
(>21)
Variables n=150 n=288 n=300 n=190
Juvenile arrest rate 45.99 46.13 50.14 59.27
Overall arrest rate 59.62 59.44 57.35 64.52
Per capita income (in thousands) 19.2 18.75 18.96 19.31
Unemployment 4.82 5.65 5.79 5.34
Population density 130.74 131.94 145.64 216.38
Owner-occupied homes 62.81 63.1 62.31 60.76
Youth proportion 10.23 10.65 10.67 10.71
Minority proportion 29.07 23 22.27 25.99
Public safety dollars 112.49 100.56 102.62 110.64
Sanctions comprehensiveness score
Table 3.3  Mean differences in counties by sanctions comprehensiveness                                                 
in the pre-reform period  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3.4  Regression analysis results predicting county-level juvenile crime rates  
Variables (n=1572) Β  SE Β SE Β SE Β  SE
Continuum comprehensiveness 0.52 ** 0.18 0.41 0.17 -0.82 2.08 -0.82 * 0.28
Post reform indicator 9.29 5.10 7.54 4.99 5.40 3.42 5.41 7.79
Comprehensiveness post reform -0.75 *** 0.22 -0.72 ** 0.26 -0.60 ** 0.18 -0.60 0.43
Per capita income 0.79 *** 0.16 -0.09 0.21 -0.47 0.33 -0.47 0.56
Unemployment -0.4 0.24 -0.63 ** 0.24 -0.29 0.22 -0.29 0.34
Population density 0.02 *** 0.00 0.03 *** 0 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.03
Owner-occupied homes -0.25 ** 0.07 -0.29 *** 0.07 0.98 ** 0.31 0.98 0.62
Youth proportion 2.28 ** 0.71 2.83 *** 0.7 0.84 0.74 0.84 1.55
Minority proportion -0.04 0.04 -0.11 ** 0.04 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.32
Family court -10.53 *** 2.28 -11.15 *** 2.24 -6.89 *** 1.91 -6.89 4.16
Public safety dollars 0.04 *** 0.01 0.03 ** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
Overall crime rate 0.85 *** 0.00 0.87 *** 0.02 0.67 *** 0.03 0.67 *** 0.06
Time trend 4.20 *** 0.42 4.57 *** 0.37 4.57 *** 0.61
Time trend squared -0.17 *** 0.02 -0.17 *** 0.02 -0.17 *** 0.02
R-squared 0.70 0.72 0.88 0.88
aThough not reported, models included county fixed effects
b
 Model estimated using clustered robust standard errors
***p < .001   **p < .01   *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 4a,b
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 Table 3.5  Estimated effects of individual sanctions components on county-level juvenile crime rates 
        Β          Β          Β          Β          Β          Β          Β          Β          Β  
SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE
Continuum comprehensiveness 0.53 ** 0.53 0.67 *** 0.67 0.38 0.38
0.20 0.61 0.19 0.47 0.21 0.62
Post reform indicator -4.33 ** 6.46 6.46 -4.82 * 7.52 ** 7.52 -4.62 * 7.40 7.40
1.55 5.30 8.12 2.25 4.98 7.83 1.52 5.64 9.73
Comprehensiveness post reform -0.63 * -0.63 -0.79 ** -0.79 * -0.71 *
0.30 0.47 0.40 0.32
Full availability of sanctions 
components post-reform 
(interaction term)
    Structured activities -3.59 -1.45 -1.45
1.93 2.18 2.81
    Restorative programs -0.96 1.59 1.59
2.15 2.35 3.06
    Community day programs -3.34 -0.14 -0.14
2.10 2.56 3.53
    Clinical services
    Residential programs
Note.
   Though not reported, all models were estimated using all control variables, the time trend variables, 
   and the corresponding component indicator for the reported sanctions component interaction term 
aEstimated with clustered robust standard errors
***p < .001   **p < .01   *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 4 Model 8 Model 9a Model 5 Model 6a Model 7
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 Table 3.5   (continued)
        Β          Β          Β          Β          Β          Β          Β          Β  
SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE
Continuum comprehensiveness 0.39 * 0.36 0.36 0.85 **
0.18 0.53 0.19 0.58 0.31
Post reform indicator -5.13 *** 7.28 7.28 -4.64 ** 3.66 3.66 -3.48 -2.13
1.47 5.02 7.89 1.44 5.40 7.79 2.31 7.04
Comprehensiveness post reform -0.69 ** -0.69 -0.47 -0.47 -0.08
0.27 0.44 0.30 0.44 0.47
Full availability of sanctions 
components post-reform 
(interaction term)
    Structured activities -2.35 -2.18
2.05 2.22
    Restorative programs 0.89 0.87
2.21 2.40
    Community day programs -2.59 -2.29
2.16 2.79
    Clinical services -2.29 -1.17 -1.17 -2.54 -2.44
2.31 2.35 2.92 2.37 2.48
    Residential programs -7.28 ** -5.24 -5.24 -7.22 ** -6.78 *
2.50 2.80 3.31 2.54 3.03
Note.
   Though not reported, all models were estimated using all control variables, the time trend variables, 
   and the corresponding component indicator for the reported sanctions component interaction term 
aEstimated with clustered robust standard errors
***p < .001   **p < .01   *p < .05
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12a Model 13 Model 14 Model 15a Model 16 Model 17
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Figure 3.1  National and state juvenile crime trends
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CHAPTER 4 
COMMUNITY-BASED SANCTIONS OR SECURE CUSTODY 
 
Custody rates for juveniles increased throughout the early 1990s and have begun to 
decline in the last decade.  Concerns about the cost, cost-effectiveness, and racial disparity in 
the use of secure custody for juveniles arose in response to the rising trend.  Such issues have 
likely contributed to the consideration of sanctions alternatives.  The use of graduated 
sanctions as a commonly adopted policy in state juvenile justice systems may have helped 
decrease custody rates.  Federal legislation defines graduated sanctions as a wide array of 
escalating sanctions for juveniles that are expected to be based in local communities 
whenever public safety is not compromised.  Such community-based alternatives provide 
greater dispositional options and help ensure that secure custody is used only in cases 
involving the most serious offenses. 
This study examined the effect of available community-based sanctions on county-
level juvenile custody rates in one state.  North Carolina passed juvenile justice legislation 
formalizing the use of community-based sanctions in 1998.  One of the explicit goals of the 
policy was to reduce reliance on secure custody for juveniles.  In order to isolate the effect of 
the policy reform, other influences on custody rates need consideration.  This chapter 
provides a brief review of the literature concerning determinants of punishment policy.  
Given concerns about racial disparities in the use of secure custody, theories about 
punishment that consider race are emphasized.  Multivariate regression analysis with a 
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county-level longitudinal dataset was used to examine the effect of the legislation on juvenile 
custody rates while controlling for alternative explanations for punishment practices.  
Punishment for Juvenile Offenders 
National Juvenile Custody Rates 
The late 1980s ushered in a punitive cycle of juvenile justice and the use of secure 
custody as a sanction for delinquency increased.  Once juveniles had been adjudicated 
delinquent in court, there was an increase in the use of confinement in a secure or residential 
facility as compared to other disposition options.  The proportion of adjudicated juveniles 
placed in custody increased from 10.8%  in 1991 to 12.9% in 2000 and then began to decline 
to 11.1% in 2004 (Stahl, Finnegan, & Kang, 2007).  Day counts of youth in residential 
placement also showed a high point in the use of secure custody in the late 1990s.  The 
number dropped from a rate of 356 juveniles in custody per 100,000 youth in the population 
in 1997 to a rate of 295 in 2006 (Sickmund, Sladky, & Kang, 2008). 
Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of secure custody in reducing juvenile crime 
According to the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968; Levitt, 1998), harsher 
punishments or greater probability of apprehension and punishment will deter criminal 
behavior because of the increased cost associated with criminal choices.  Secure custody, a 
harsh punishment as compared to other sanctions options, should theoretically deter 
delinquent behavior among youth.  Findings from deterrence studies in juvenile justice, 
however, are mixed.  Some studies have shown that increased use of secure custody 
decreased crime (Levitt, 1998) and some did not (Guis, 1999; Schneider & Ervin, 1990; 
Steinberg & Haskins, 2008).  A recent study of New York City youth compared offenders 
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disposed to secure custody to those subject to community-based sanctions and showed that 
secure custody actually increased the likelihood of recidivism (Noe, 2008).   
In addition to questions about effectiveness, policy professionals and researchers have 
also been concerned about the cost of juvenile incarceration which is significantly higher 
than other community-based alternatives (Austin, Johnson, & Weitzer, 2005).  Cost-benefit 
analysis studies have indicated that reliance on incarceration and harsh sentencing is not a 
cost-effective alternative compared to other strategies for juvenile crime control and 
reduction (Fass & Pi, 2002; Greenwood, Model, Rydell, & Chiesa, 1996; Roberts & 
Camasso, 1991; Robertson, Grimes, & Rogers, 2001).  Recent studies suggest that the 
general public also places more value on rehabilitative spending for juveniles than the costs 
of more punitive options like secure custody (Krisberg & Machionna, 2007; Nagin, Piquero, 
Scott, & Steinberg, 2006). 
Racial Disparity in Secure Custody 
Racial disparity exists at all levels in the juvenile justice system, including secure 
custody rates.  Although custody rates for all youth populations have declined in recent years, 
minorities consistently have a higher rate of out-of-home placement than whites or the total 
adjudicated population.  Figure 4.1 shows the national trend over time and compares the 
overall rate to subgroups based on race or ethnicity.  The 2005 national rate of out-of-home 
placement per 100 adjudicated juveniles was 22.5 for all youth, but 20.7 for white youth, 
25.4 for black youth, and 31.0 for American Indian or Alaskan Native youth (Puzzanchera & 
Adams, 2008).  Census counts of youth in residential placement on a given day show a more 
striking racial disparity.  In particular, the number of black juveniles in residential placement 
on a given day in 2006 was 767 per 100,000 youth compared to a rate of 170 for white youth 
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(Sickmund et al., 2008).   Multiple concerns including cost, effectiveness, and racial disparity 
may have prompted policy efforts to reduce reliance upon secure custody for juveniles.   
Federal and State Sanctions Policy 
Federal Graduated Sanctions Policy 
The recent trend of decreasing secure custody rates corresponds to federal and state 
efforts to support alternative sanctions policy in juvenile justice (Austin et al., 2005; 
Coolbaugh & Hansel, 2000; Howell, 2003; Matese & Tuell, 1999; Mondoro, Wight, & Tuell, 
2001; Wiebush, 2002).  Beginning in 1998, federal funding for state juvenile justice systems 
has been contingent upon the use of graduated sanctions (Development Services Group, 
2002; Griffin, 1999; Parent & Barnett, 2003).  Legislative and administrative documents 
define graduated sanctions as an array of sanctions, available for every offense, that are sure, 
immediate, individualized, and that escalate with subsequent and more serious offenses.  In 
addition, the definition specifically emphasizes the use of community-based sanctions when 
appropriate and safe (Consequences for Juvenile Offenders Act, 2002; Howell, 1995).   
Community-Based Sanctions in North Carolina 
In order to specifically identify the effect of available community-based sanctions on 
secure custody rates, it may be helpful to focus on juvenile justice reform in one state.  North 
Carolina is one of many states which enacted juvenile justice reforms, including the adoption 
of graduated sanctions, during the 1990s.  Given a strong system of county government and 
mandated local responsibility for the establishment of alternative sanctions for juveniles, 
North Carolina provides an opportunity to utilize variability in local continuums of sanctions 
to evaluate state policy outcomes.  North Carolina’s Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998 
established multiple reforms that took effect in July of 1999, including the creation of the 
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state Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (Mason, 1999).  Similar to 
legislative efforts in most states (Mears, 2002), reforms included the introduction of risk and 
needs assessment tools and a disposition grid to guide juvenile sentencing decisions.  In 
addition, state law mandated the creation of county-based JCPCs to provide a continuum of 
community-based services and sanctions at the local level.  Counties partner with the state to 
ensure a wide array of available sanctions options.  As in many other states, the sanctions 
continuum component of the reform is guided in part by the OJJDP’s Comprehensive 
Strategy for chronic, serious, and violent offenders (Wilson & Howell, 1993).   
State legislative reforms included multiple policy goals, including the development of 
“noninstitutional dispositional alternatives that will protect the community and the juvenile” 
(Juvenile Justice Reform Act, 1998, emphasis added).  The law acknowledged the need for 
protection of juveniles, which reasonably encompasses the appropriate and fair use of secure 
custody.  The availability of a community-based continuum of services, as well as a 
dispositional matrix to guide decision-making, was expected to ensure juvenile offenders 
would receive appropriate sanctions and only those with the most severe offenses and offense 
histories would be sentenced to secure custody.  If community-based sanctions are viewed as 
an alternative to secure custody, then a higher level of available options should decrease 
juvenile secure custody rates.   
Alternative Explanations for Punishment 
Studies of Adult Incarceration Rates 
 To assess the effects of the reform legislation on custody rates, it is important to 
consider alternative explanations for variation in utilization of secure custody.  Studies of 
state-level incarceration rates for adults have examined effects of crime levels, political 
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influences, regional differences, economic conditions, and demographic variations in 
subgroups that may be perceived as a threat to social order (Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs 
& Carmichael, 2001; Smith, 2004; Yates & Fording, 2005).  Two studies employed a random 
effects statistical model using state-level pooled cross-sectional data across three time 
periods.  Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) found that the strength of the Republican Party had 
the largest positive effect on incarceration rates.  Proportion of blacks in the state population 
also had a positive effect on incarceration.  Greenberg and West (2001) conducted a similar 
study and found that higher violent crime rates increased incarceration rates, as did 
unemployment and proportion of the population that is black.  Smith’s study (2004) used 
annual state-level data from 1980 to 1995 with panel-corrected standard errors and found no 
significant effects for the crime rate.  The black proportion of the population was a positive 
and significant predictor of incarceration rates, and higher percentages of Democratic 
partisanship decreased incarceration rates.  A state-level evaluation of the effect of 
sentencing guidelines on incarceration rates used many of the above variables as controls 
(Nicholoson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).  The proportion of the population that was black and the 
crime rate both had statistically significant positive effects on incarceration rates.  
Juveniles, Punishment, and Race 
Many of the studies of adult incarceration rates found that the minority proportion of 
the population had an effect on punishment outcomes.  Fewer studies have directly examined 
determinants of custody rates for juveniles.  The overrepresentation of minority juvenile 
populations in secure custody, however, raises particular concern about the possible effects 
of racial bias in juvenile dispositions.  Though explanations for racial disparity may vary, 
literature reviews of past studies in juvenile justice have supported the notion that minority 
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youth in the juvenile justice system may be subject to different sentencing outcomes based 
upon race (Bishop & Frazier, 1996; Engen, Steen, & Bridges, 2002; Lieber, 2002; Pope, 
Lovell, & Hsia, 2002).    
The symbolic threat framework posits that areas with higher proportions of groups 
perceived as a threat to social order will make greater use of formal social control 
mechanisms such as secure custody (Hawkins, 1987; Quinney, 1970; Sampson & Laub, 
1993; Smith, 2004; Tittle & Curran, 1988).  Some scholars have attributed the creation of the 
juvenile justice system as a whole to the desire to control specific groups in the population 
considered to be dangerous or threatening—young urban immigrants in particular (Platt, 
1977; Sutton, 1990).  Recent decades have seen a resurgence of concern about subgroups in 
the population perceived as dangerous (Garland, 2001; Rose, 2002).   
Some studies in juvenile justice have directly assessed whether professionals perceive 
offenders differently based upon their race, lending support to the symbolic threat 
framework.  Probation officers may view black youth as more likely to recidivate than white 
youth because they link criminal behavior to internal personality traits that may not be 
amenable to treatment (Bridges & Steen, 1998).  Juvenile justice personnel have expressed 
beliefs about racial differences in terms of delinquency involvement and cooperation during 
the court process (Lieber & Jamieson, 1995; Lieber & Stairs, 1999).  In a study with over 
5,000 randomly selected delinquency cases from three jurisdictions in Iowa, African-
American youth from the jurisdiction whose staff held the strongest beliefs in racial 
differences pertaining to criminal behavior and attitudes were more likely than whites to be 
referred for formal court processing at intake (Lieber & Stairs, 1999).    
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  Building upon assumptions of the symbolic threat framework, studies in juvenile 
justice have assessed the effect of race on decision-making outcomes for juveniles.  Lieber 
and Mack (2003) examined whether race, gender, or household composition affected 
decision-making at multiple levels of the juvenile justice system. The individual-level study 
used a random sample of 6,993 youth from four Iowa counties, including a disproportionate 
sampling of African Americans, over a decade-long time span beginning in 1981.  Analysis 
was conducted using a multivariate logistic regression model, controlling for selection bias 
using a hazard rate calculated in a two-stage model.  The study found that African-Americans 
were more likely than whites to be referred to formal court proceedings at intake.  Effect of 
race was not significant at the decision-making point regarding disposition to secure custody 
versus other options.  Noting discrepancies in juvenile custody rates across states, Mears 
(2006) used a cross-sectional design to examine different explanations, including those based 
upon tenets of symbolic threat, for variation in state-level custody rates for juveniles.  
Alternative explanations included the use of juvenile incarceration as a response to legitimate 
concerns about juvenile crime, a reflection of prevalent adult policies, or regional differences 
in the cultural acceptance of punitive policies.  In models including all control variables, 
results showed that juvenile property crime, adult violent crime and incarceration rates, and 
regional indicators had the strongest effects on juvenile incarceration.  
Geography and Juvenile Justice 
Some scholars have argued that the sense of symbolic threat, and corresponding 
patterns of differential treatment, may vary based upon urbanization and geographic region 
(Hawkins, 1987; Lieber & Stairs, 1999).  Other cultural or ideological attitudes about crime 
and institutional responses to crime are likely to vary by region (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; 
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Mears, 2006).  Feld (1991) has argued that the formality of urban courts tends to result in 
more severe sentences for juveniles.  An older study of the juvenile justice system showed 
evidence of differences in youth confinement across states and regions (Krisberg, Litsky, & 
Schwartz, 1984).  Both the adult criminal justice system (Mauer & King, 2007) and the 
juvenile justice system (Mears, 2006) show considerable variation in incarceration rates 
across states and regions, so possible influences on custody rates related to geography and 
urbanization should be considered.       
Research Design and Methodology 
Using county-level longitudinal data, this study examined the effects of juvenile 
justice reform, and community-based sanctions in particular, on secure custody rates over 
time and across sites.  Multivariate regression analysis was used to control for alternative 
explanations for variability in custody rates.  Counties were classified in terms of the 
comprehensiveness of implementation in the local continuum of services.  Counties with a 
high level of implementation served as the intervention group and those with low levels of 
implementation served as a comparison group in a quasi-experimental research design.  
Propensity scores were used to match counties, create a smaller sample of matched pairs, and 
control for the possible effects of selection bias.  
Data  
 Each county in North Carolina has a JCPC comprised of representatives from the 
juvenile courts, local law enforcement, human service providers, parents, and local youth that 
is responsible for the continuum of services provided to juveniles in the county.  Annually, 
each JCPC is required to conduct an assessment of available services within the county and 
provide a standardized report describing existing services within six program types 
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(structured activities, restorative services, day programming, clinical assessment and 
services, and residential programs) and across multiple levels of supervision.  The assessment 
reports for 93 of 100 counties from the planning years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 constituted 
the basis of the data used to construct a measure of sanctions continuum implementation, 
classify counties in terms of high or low levels of implementation, and determine comparison 
groups.  These years were chosen due to the availability of reliable data and to allow for a 
five-year period following the adoption of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act to allow for full 
implementation.   
The measure of the comprehensiveness of continuum implementation in each county 
was based upon an additive sum of scores for each program type in each of three different 
levels of supervision (immediate sanctions, intermediate sanctions, post-release services to 
transition from secure custody) which are available to system-involved youth.  According to 
the total implementation score, counties were classified as high or low implementers.  For the 
purpose of this analysis, high implementation indicated that a county had 75% or more of 
suggested services fully available to youth.  Other classification schemes were tested, but this 
categorization was chosen for its substantive interpretability and the goodness-of-fit of the 
logit models used to predict selection into the high implementation group.  Nineteen of the 93 
counties comprised the high implementation group.  The indicator of high implementation 
served as the key explanatory variable in the policy evaluation.   
The outcome variable was the county-level juvenile custody rate.  The rate was the 
number of county youth admitted to one of the state-run secure Youth Development Centers 
(YDCs) per 10,000 youth aged 10-15 in the county for a given year.  North Carolina’s upper 
age limit for juvenile jurisdiction is 15, so all youth age 16 and higher would be processed in 
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adult court and not subject to secure custody in the YDCs.  The data are available to the 
public from the North Carolina State Data Center, and the original source is the North 
Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.  Longitudinal data 
from the years 1990 to 2006 were used to measure custody rates before and after the adoption 
of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998.  The total sample included 1,581 observations 
from 93 counties over 17 years.  Additional longitudinal demographic, economic, and 
political data used as control variables are also available to the public from multiple state 
agencies through the State Data Center.  Table 4.1 contains descriptive statistics for all 
variables. 
Statistical Model and Explanatory Variables 
 This study used a difference-in-difference (DD) statistical model to examine effects 
of juvenile justice reform, including mandated community-based sanctions continuums, in 
North Carolina.  A DD model simultaneously controlled for changes across time (before and 
after the policy was adopted) and between different types of counties to isolate the average 
treatment effect.   The basic model can be represented by the equation: 
CustodyRatect = α + β1CBSc + β2Pt + β3(CBSc*Pt) + β4Cct+ β5 Xct + β6 Zc + β7Tt + uc + ect 
The outcome variable was the county-level juvenile custody rate.  The key explanatory 
variable in the analysis, CBSc, was an indicator variable that represented county membership 
in a particular comparison group based upon the degree of implementation of community-
based sanctions.   It took on a value of 1 if the county had a high level of implementation of 
the sanctions continuum and 0 if it did not.  Pt represents an indicator variable for the time 
period before or after the juvenile justice policy reforms were adopted.  The post-reform 
period was coded as 1.  The interaction term between the group indicator and time indicator 
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isolated the effect of the policy and controlled for the effects of time and existing differences 
between groups.   
Multiple measures of crime (Cct) were also included in the model to control for the 
possibility that increased custody rates reflected an institutional response to increased 
delinquent activity.  In addition to the overall juvenile arrest rate, the juvenile violent crime 
rate was included in some analyses because secure custody is most often used in cases 
involving serious crimes.  County-level juvenile arrest data specifically for violent crime 
were not available for the entire time period.  As a proxy, the overall violent crime rate was 
discounted by the proportion of all criminal arrests involving youth ages 10-17 in each 
county for a given year.  Because juveniles tend to commit violent crime at a lower rate than 
other crimes, the measure probably overestimated the level of juvenile violent crime.  If the 
use of secure custody is a response to fear of crime, rather than actual crime by juveniles, it 
seems plausible that the overall violent crime rate would also affect custody rates because 
most violent crime is committed by adults.  The measure utilized represents a level of violent 
crime that likely falls between the actual levels of juvenile and overall violent crime.  The 
greater prevalence of adult crime as compared to juvenile crime may influence perceptions 
about criminal behavior and influence juvenile punishment practices, so the overall crime 
rate was also included in some models.  Each of these three crime measures had observations 
with missing data, so the total analytical sample included 1,557 observations.    
  Xct represents a vector of time-varying controls for each county including 
demographic, political, and socioeconomic characteristics. The proportions of the county 
population that were adolescent, minority, and receiving welfare and percentage of families 
headed by female householders were included in the analysis, reflecting the practice in other 
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studies to consider the effect of group size for subpopulations that may be perceived as a 
threat to social order (Mears, 2006; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; Smith, 2004).  The 
models also utilized percent change in a five year-period for minority and youth populations.  
Per capita income, unemployment rate, population density, percent change in county 
population, and Democratic proportion of voters were included as controls.    
Per capita expenditures for public safety and human services and an indicator variable 
to represent whether or not a county was within a jurisdiction with a family court were used 
as variables.  Family courts have been introduced in different counties at various points over 
the time period in order to promote coordination of cases involving juveniles.  These 
variables helped control for the influence of other policy changes in the state. 
 Zc represents the time-invariant indicator variables for geographic regions in the state 
that controlled for unobserved cultural or ideological differences in attitudes about crime.  
Three indicator variables were included to represent the eastern portion of the state, the 
central region including the capital county, and the far western region.  The largest city in the 
state is in the reference region, labeled Piedmont.  Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for 
the total analytical sample and by region.  The most notable differences were the low crime 
and custody rates in the western region.  Apart from the west, the reference region had the 
lowest incarceration rate despite the highest crime rate.  Other large differences across 
regions were evident in population density and minority percent.  The smaller number of 
observations in the Piedmont was due to the seven counties in that region without sanctions 
data.  
Interactions were tested to further isolate particular subgroups that may be subject to 
the highest use of secure custody and to examine regional effects.  The model included 
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county-level random effects to account for the autocorrelation within counties over time.  A 
random effects model allows the inclusion of time invariant variables in the analysis 
(Fitzmaurice, Laird, & Ware, 2004).   A time trend variable and its square (Tt) were included 
as a strategy to control for the serial correlation often found in crime data (Singer & Willett, 
2003; Woolridge, 2003).    
Propensity Score Matching 
The construction of comparison groups based upon varying levels of implementation 
was a key feature of this statistical model.  Because the county-based JCPCs have discretion 
in developing the sanctions continuum, it was important to control for effects of self selection 
into high or low implementation groups (Berk, 2003).  Local characteristics which affect 
custody rates were also likely to influence the degree of implementation of community-based 
sanctions.  Using data from the pre-reform period of time, Table 4.2 shows the mean 
differences between high and low implementation counties in the analytical sample.  
Notably, the high implementation counties had higher crime rates, were more densely 
populated, and had a higher proportion of counties from the East region.  These differences 
were all statistically significant.  Many of these factors were probably also related to secure 
custody rates.   
Other evaluations of criminal and juvenile justice initiatives have used propensity 
scores to address selection bias (Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2007; Noe, 2008).  
Propensity scores were used to match each of the 19 counties in the high implementation 
group to one nearest neighbor in the low implementation group.  Initial steps to assess the 
degree of common support between the two groups revealed two outliers in the high 
implementation group unlikely to find a match in the comparison group.  See Appendix C for 
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the descriptive statistics of the log odds ratios for the two different groups.  These two 
counties were excluded from the matching procedure, resulting in a matched pairs sample of 
34 counties.  Both probit and logit models were used to predict propensity scores.  The logit 
model selected to match counties had the best overall model fit and is described in Table 4.3.  
Once the matches were determined, a balancing test was conducted to ensure that the 
two groups showed no statistical differences in mean propensity scores and mean values of 
the covariates within quartiles constructed from propensity scores (Handa & Maluccio, 
2008).  Appendix D lists the mean differences in covariates and propensity scores by quartile.  
No statistical differences were found, likely due to the small number of counties in each 
group.  The highest quartile only had one low implementation group in it, precluding the 
possibililty of tests of significant differences.  Because the high implementation counties 
with the highest propensity scores were unlikely to have good matches, three more counties 
were dropped and the matching procedure was repeated.  The Chi square for the logit model 
predicting selection into high implementation was no longer statistically significant at the p < 
.05 level and the proportion of explained variability dropped by 10%.  In light of concerns 
about model fit and sample size, the three counties were retained and utilized in the matching 
procedure and final sample.  Due to this limitation, matches for some of the counties were 
not optimal and selection bias may not have been adequately addressed.   
The sample of 34 counties over 17 years, less the observations with missing crime 
data, yielded a total of 571 observations in the analytical sample.  The matching procedure 
reduced the differences between groups in the pre-reform period as shown in Table 4.2.   
In particular, the large difference in population density decreased from 77.32 to 14.62 and 
was no longer statistically significant.  The low implementation group included 28% of 
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counties from the central region as compared to 5% in the high group.  The difference was 
eliminated in matching and both groups had 6% of counties from that region.  Proportional 
differences in the other regions also improved or remained the same.  The difference in the 
percent change in minority population was no longer statistically significant, changing from 
8.31% in high implementation counties and 11.38% in low implementation counties to 
approximately 8% for both groups.   
In constrast, the difference in minority proportion of the population did increase 
slightly, from 26% and 24% for high and low implementation groups respectively to 27% 
and 23%, and became statistically significant.  Notably, differences remained in crime rates.  
The overall juvenile crime rate difference increased from slightly below 11 to slightly above 
11, though its statistical significance decreased.  The difference in juvenile violent crime 
decreased from 16.75 to 9.32, but the overall crime rate difference increased from about 5.03 
to 7.27.  Efforts to address selection bias did reduce some of the differences between the 
groups, but did not eliminate them.  Specifically, the persistent overall difference in the 
juvenile crime rate may represent a factor that likely influences both implementation and 
custody rates.  
Results 
Juvenile Justice Reform and Custody Rates 
Figure 4.2 illustrates a clear drop in the state custody rates over time and lists the 
mean custody rate for each time period.  There was a statistically significant difference 
(p<.001) in the mean custody rate for the pre and post-reform periods.  On average, 7 less 
youth per 10,000 in the population were placed in secure custody following juvenile justice 
reforms.  The drop represents about a 50% decrease.  Both groups of counties saw a 7 point 
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decrease in custody rates; high implementation from 14.7 to 7.5 and low implementation 
from 15.3 to 8.1.  Despite higher crime levels, the mean custody rate for the high 
implementation group was lower than the low implementation group in both time periods.  
The difference, however, was not statistically significant.  Lack of available community-
based sanctions alternatives may be associated with the use of secure custody in cases that 
would not otherwise warrant such a punitive response.  The significant decrease in custody 
rates following juvenile justice reform is obvious in Figure 4.2, but the effect of available 
sanctions alternatives is not clear.    
Positive relationships existed between custody rates and many of the variables used to 
examine alternative explanations for utilization of secure custody.  Table 4.4 lists the Pearson  
correlation coefficients for the variables with the strongest associations with custody rates.  
The crime measures all had the largest correlation coefficients, and the overall juvenile crime 
rate (r = .39) was larger than the juvenile violent crime rate (r = .31), perhaps due to the 
imprecision of the violent crime measure.  Among the socioeconomic variables associated 
with the idea of symbolic threat, welfare proportion had the strongest association with 
custody rates (r = .37) and then minority proportion (r = .30).  Many of the other 
socioeconomic variables had high correlations with minority proportion, so they may explain 
some of the relationship between minority percentage and custody rates.  In particular, the 
very high correlation between minority percentage and proportion of families headed by 
females (r = .82) precluded the use of both simultaneously in the analytical models.   
Multivariate Analysis 
The initial regression model shown in Table 4.5 used the entire analytical sample.  
Due to the high correlations between groupings of explanatory variables (shown in Table 4.4) 
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the initial model used minority proportion without measures of female-headed homes, youth, 
or welfare percentages.  Overall juvenile crime rate was used initially because of its stronger 
relationship with custody rates as compared to juvenile violent crime.  Democratic proportion 
of voters was strongly correlated to minority percent (r=.78) so it was excluded in the initial 
model.  Figure 2.2 illustrates a non-linear trend in custody rates following reform, with the 
largest decrease in custody rates immediately following reform.  Although the legislation was 
passed in 1998, reforms were implemented beginning July 1, 1999.  Custody rates represent 
numbers for the calendar year, so the full impact of legislative changes would not be evident 
until 2000.  An indicator of the immediate post-reform years of 2000 and 2001 and its 
interaction with the post-reform and high implementation group indicators were included in 
the analysis and reported in the first model of Table 4.5.   
The inclusion of the second post-reform time indicator decreased the coefficient of 
the post-reform indicator, but it remained statistically significant.  The drop in custody rates 
in the years immediately following reform was larger than later years.  The indicator for the 
high implementation group was negative and significant, reflecting an average difference of 
3 fewer youth per 10,000 in custody.  This finding reflects the lower custody rate for that 
group in the pre-reform period evident in Figure 4.2.  The interaction terms were not 
significant, so initial analysis suggested no significant difference in the decrease of custody 
rates between groups following reform.  This finding may reflect the seeming convergence of 
custody rates immediately following reform.  Among the control variables, both minority 
percent and juvenile crime increased the custody rate.  Counties in the eastern region also had 
an average of 6 more youth in custody even controlling for socioeconomic differences and 
crime rates.  Increased unemployment, growth in the minority population, and counties in a 
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family court jurisdiction had negative effects on custody rates.  The time trend variable and 
its square were significant in all models, but their effects are not reported in the table. 
Subsequent analyses then examined whether any of the variables correlated with 
minority percent in the county population served to mediate the effect on custody rates.  
Neither youth proportion nor welfare proportion rendered minority proportion insignificant, 
and neither variable was significant when introduced into the models alone or with minority 
proportion.  Inclusion of female-headed households, however, rendered the estimate for 
minority proportion statistically insignificant.  An increase in the proportion of female-
headed households also increased custody rates.  All later models, therefore, used the 
household variable rather than minority percent.  Democratic proportion was also introduced 
because the collinearity with minority percent was no longer problematic.  Similar steps were 
used to specify which crime variables resulted in the best models.  Each crime variable was 
statistically significant when introduced individually, but estimates for overall crime and then 
juvenile crime showed slightly larger effects on custody rates than juvenile violent crime.  
When all three measures were introduced simultaneously, only overall crime was statistically 
significant.  Violent crime was not significant when paired with either of the other crime 
variables, but juvenile crime remained significant when introduced with overall crime.  For 
simplicity, the remaining models shown in Table 4.5 include only the overall juvenile crime 
rate to control for the general level of delinquent activity.  Separate analyses using the other 
crime variables also showed statistically significant positive effect on custody rates.     
Inclusion of additional control variables in the second model of Table 4.5 did not vary 
the results for the policy variables.  The treatment effects of the high implementation group 
in either post-reform period remained insignificant.  Because the model controlled for the 
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high implementation group in the post-reform period, the statistically significant negative 
effects of the post-reform indicators show that the low implementation group decreased 
custody rates by approximately 3 youth per 10,000 in each time period following the juvenile 
justice legislation.  Excepting omitted or unobserved historical changes, it seems likely that 
the decrease for the low implementation group is a result of the reforms.  Strong regional 
effects remained.  In addition to the large positive effect of the eastern region, counties in the 
central region also had higher custody rates by approximately 4 youth per 10,000.  Estimated 
effects of unemployment, percent change in minority and county population, and eastern 
region changed slightly in magnitude but remained significant and negative.  Family courts 
were no longer significant.  Both welfare proportion and percent of families headed by a 
female had positive and statistically significant effects on custody rates, but increased 
Democratic proportion decreased custody rates. 
Regional Interactions 
 Ideological differences based on region or urbanization could influence custody rates 
either through beliefs about perceived threats or beliefs about appropriate responses to crime 
(Hawkins, 1987; Lieber & Stairs, 1999, Feld, 1991; Mears, 2006, Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2001).  To further delineate the regional effects, interaction terms were created between the 
regions and each of the crime variables and the socioeconomic variables associated with 
assumptions of symbolic threat, including female households, welfare proportion, and 
minority percent.  To assess differences based on urbanization, similar interaction terms were 
created using population density and the other variables, but none of those interactions were 
statistically significant.  The only regional interactions that had an effect on custody rates 
included the crime variables.  These results are listed in model 3 of Table 4.5.  Interactions 
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between the juvenile crime rate and the eastern and central indicators were positive and 
statistically significant, but the overall effect of crime became statistically insignificant as did 
the regional indicators.  In the Eastern region, an increase of 10 in the juvenile crime rate 
increased the custody rate by almost 2 youth compared to the reference region.  The average 
increase for custody rates in the central region was approximately 1 with a similar increase in 
juvenile crime.  The regional effects may be related to a more punitive stance in response to 
juvenile crime rather than varying perceptions about groups that may be perceived as a 
symbolic threat.  When the overall crime and juvenile violent crime measures were used in 
interactions, the results were similar in that the interactions with the central and eastern 
regions were positive and significant but the crime measure and the regional indicators 
became insignificant.  Effects for the post-reform indicators and other control variables did 
not change in terms of direction or significance except for the high implementation indicator.  
High implementation counties no longer had a statistically significant effect on custody rates 
prior to reform, so the regional-crime interactions may explain some of the pre-reform 
differences in groups.  Effects of control variables varied only slightly, but the negative effect 
of family courts was again statistically significant indicating that counties in a family court 
jurisdiction had about 2.5 less youth per 10,000 in secure custody compared to those counties 
with traditional court structures.  
Selection Effects  
 The statistically significant predictors positively related to the likelihood of selection 
into the high implementation group included youth proportion and growth in the youth 
population, a Democratic District Attorney, human service expenditures, and population 
density as shown in Table 4.3.  Counties in the central region were less likely to have high 
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implementation of sanctions continuums.  Analysis with the smaller matched pairs sample 
showed the effects of some variables remained unchanged even when controlling for some of 
the observed selection bias as shown in the last model in Table 4.5.  A 10% increase in the 
proportion of families headed by a female increased the custody rate by 5 youth, but a 10% 
increase in county population decreased the custody rate by 3.6 youth.  The regional effect 
for the east remained positive and significant, with 9 more youth in custody in that region, 
and family courts decreased custody rates by 5 youth.  Welfare proportion and 
unemployment became insignificant.  Finally, the post-reform indicator remained significant 
and negative suggesting a lingering effect of legislation reform for the low implementation 
groups.  Despite efforts to control for selection bias and decrease differences in comparison 
groups, the significant and negative effect of the high implementation group variable 
indicated that the two groups had a difference of 4 youth in custody per 10,000 prior to 
reform.   Though omitted or unobservable variables may explain the difference, it seems 
possible that counties without community-based sanctions alternatives used secure custody to 
address juvenile crime for lack of other options.  
Discussion and Policy Implications 
 This study has shown that juvenile custody rates in North Carolina decreased 
significantly following juvenile justice reform.  The role of community-based sanctions in 
the decrease, however, was less clear.  Methodological challenges in measurement and 
efforts to correct for selection bias possibly obscured the true effect of community-based 
sanctions.  Future research may be able to provide more rigorous and more precise 
approaches to untangle such methodological difficulties and provide greater confidence in 
the results.  This study, however, provides important insights into the overall effect of 
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juvenile justice reform on custody rates, the significance of policy implementation, and 
consideration of regional differences in policy implementation and outcomes.  
Methodological Limitations 
  The measurement of policy implementation may not have been sufficiently precise to 
reflect the available sanctions alternatives in the community.  The indicator variable for 
group membership reflected a classification based upon the availability of at least 75% of all 
program types across supervision levels.  Other thresholds or classification schemes may 
have produced different results.  The underlying index for the classification scheme was also 
based upon a solely quantitative measure of implementation.  If counties had few services, 
but they were very high quality, perhaps that would have a greater effect than having 
extensive services of lesser quality.  In order to minimize such a problem, North Carolina has 
made strenuous efforts to ensure the adoption of effective programs within the sanctions 
continuum through the development of protocols for program selection based upon evidence-
based principles (Lipsey, Howell, & Tidd, 2007), legislative standards for program 
requirements, and ongoing program review.  In light of these efforts to ensure program 
quality, it seems reasonable to use a quantitative indicator as a first step in measuring 
implementation.   
The classification of counties into high and low implementation groups indicated the 
underlying variability of local continuums of sanctions.  In terms of research, county 
variability provided both an opportunity to study differential effects of sanctions continuums 
and raised challenges to precise estimation.  Classification based upon implementation 
introduced endogeneity into the evaluation, but alternative strategies also have inherent 
challenges.  Since juvenile justice systems vary so decidedly between states, it would be 
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difficult to identify comparison groups in a state-level evaluation.  Local variation in 
implementation also reduces the usefulness of state-level comparisons that assume a degree 
of uniformity.  Within a state, however, most comprehensive policy changes are mandated 
for all youth so assignment to different policy intervention groups is difficult apart from 
demonstration projects.  Most evaluations using random assignment occur at the individual 
level studying a specific program in a few counties or courts, but this study sought to 
examine policy outcomes using a different unit of analysis.  Future evaluations with a quasi-
experimental design may be strengthened by using different techniques to control for 
selection bias.  If propensity score matching is used, it may be necessary to impose stricter 
conditions of common support (Handa & Maluccio, 2008) despite the loss of observations for 
the sample.  Despite the limitations, the use of variability in local implementation of 
community-based sanctions represents a helpful strategy to examine the effects of a widely-
used juvenile justice policy.  This study does provide information about effects of juvenile 
justice legislation in North Carolina and more general insights about regional influences and 
other determinants of punishment for juveniles. 
Effects of Juvenile Justice Reform Legislation 
 Reform legislation in North Carolina specifically sought to decrease the use of secure 
custody for juvenile offenders.  Figure 4.2 shows a decrease of 7 commitments to secure 
custody per 10,000 youth for both high and low implementation counties.  This represents 
about a 50% reduction and can be considered a very strong success in terms of intended 
policy outcomes.  Tenets of the North Carolina legislation (Juvenile Justice Reform Act, 
1998) and other states’ efforts (Austin et al., 2005) are based on the assumption that the 
availability of sanctions alternatives facilitates dispositions other than secure custody.  All 
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counties had services for youth prior to the enactment of reform, but the legislation 
formalized and governed the development of community-based sanctions.  Low 
implementation counties had higher custody rates in the pre-reform period despite lower 
crime rates, so it seems plausible that those counties utilized secure custody for juvenile 
offenders that might have been better served with other sanctions options if they had been 
available.  Reform legislation included the mandated use of a risk assessment tool and a 
sentencing grid that restricted the use of secure custody to cases involving violent or serious 
crimes or offenders with a high risk of recidivism.  The significant and negative post-reform 
effect for the low implementation counties may reflect the forced departure from a practice of 
utilizing secure custody for non-violent offenders when other options were not available.  
The possibility of other unobserved or omitted historical influences precludes definitive 
conclusions, but it seems likely that the large decrease in custody rates is related to the 
legislation.  Effects of community-based sanctions in particular are less clear.   
Despite tentative results of this study, community-based sanctions as a part of 
juvenile justice reform should not be abandoned as a feature of juvenile justice reform.   
Implementation of sanctions was variable across counties.  Though counties were given 
discretion to develop sanctions, results showed that socioeconomic conditions contributed to 
selection into a high implementation group.  If counties lacked resources and inappropriately 
used secure custody because of the deficiency, the restrictions placed on the use of secure 
custody make it even more important to provide support to counties to ensure a full 
continuum of community-based sanctions.  Formulas used by the state to disburse juvenile 
justice funding to counties should be evaluated to ensure the counties with service gaps can 
receive designated help.  Additionally, it may be possible to facilitate collaboration across 
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counties who face similar implementation challenges.  Community-based sanctions also 
serve to meet other policy goals such as crime reduction.  Since overall juvenile crime  was a 
positive and significant  predictor of custody rates, community-based sanctions may 
indirectly affect custody rates by lowering crime rates.    
Other Determinants of Punishment for Juveniles  
 Other studies have found that the legitimate threat of crime prompts punitive 
responses such as the use of incarceration for adults or juveniles (Greenberg & West, 2001; 
Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).  This study also confirmed that increased juvenile crime 
increased secure custody rates.  The effect persisted in all models with additional control 
variables or using the matched pairs sample to address selection bias.  Additional findings 
indicated, however, that the threat of perceived crime may have also influenced utilization of 
secure custody.  A significant and positive effect of the adult crime rate, even when 
controlling for juvenile crime, suggests that the use of secure custody may represent a 
punitive response to the perceived threat of crime based upon a general awareness of crime.    
Regional effects may also be based upon different ideological frameworks about responses to 
crime (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Lieber & Stairs, 1999; Mears, 2006).  Given the 
inclusion of controls for socioeconomic differences between regions, it seems reasonable to 
purport that unobservable differences, such as attitudes about crime, constituted the basis of 
the regional effects.  Additionally, the only regional interaction terms that had a positive and 
significant effect on custody rates were the regional-crime interactions.  These variables do 
not directly measure attitudes about crime, but the findings warrant consideration of 
ideological differences and effects on institutional responses to delinquency.  Professional 
development for juvenile justice personnel and dissemination of information to the public 
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regarding evidence-based practices and policies may help reduce regional effects based upon 
ideological differences regarding institutional responses to both perceived and legitimate 
threat.  
 Similar to other studies, this evaluation found that minority percentage did have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on custody rates (Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs 
& Carmichael, 2001; Mears, 2006; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; Smith, 2004).  The 
findings should be viewed differently for two reasons.  Most of the other studies specifically 
used the proportion of the population that is black.  The available county-level data for this 
study only disaggregated the population into minority and non-minority.  Some studies have 
shown that the differential beliefs related to assumptions of symbolic threat are held about 
black youth in particular (Bridges & Steen, 1998; Lieber & Stairs, 1999).  Secondly, the 
effect of minority percent is rendered insignificant with the inclusion of the proportion of 
families headed by a single female.  Some scholars have recognized that stereotypes about 
single-parent homes may contribute to a sense of symbolic threat that influences punishment 
outcomes (Lieber & Mack, 2003; Mears, 2006).  An equally plausible explanation, however, 
is that family structure may be related to other factors such as a general level of community 
disadvantage that contributes to lack of resources and greater use of secure custody.  The 
positive and significant effect of household composition does not lend direct support to the 
symbolic threat framework, but it is an important finding that warrants consideration as a 
mediator of racial effects on punishment practices.    
Conclusions 
 The findings of this study lend empirical support for recent juvenile justice reform 
efforts in North Carolina and can be used to inform similar legislative endeavors elsewhere.   
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Custody rates decreased following reform.  While other historical explanations are possible, 
it seems likely that the decrease is the result of the policy changes.  Community-based 
sanctions should be considered one part of a larger policy that includes guidelines for 
decision-making.  Development of sanctions continuums in the state and elsewhere should be 
guided by a clear understanding of the interplay of specific policy components.  Decision-
making guidelines may have restricted the use of secure custody that counties had previously 
utilized in lieu of available alternatives.  Restricted use of secure custody makes community-
based sanctions more important as a strategy to reduce crime.   
Individualized planning for juvenile offenders is hindered without a comprehensive 
continuum of sanctions.  Family courts were not a primary focus of this study, but the 
significant and negative effect of family courts on custody rates persisted in all models.  
Family courts have been instituted to coordinate services for court-involved youth and ensure 
appropriate provision of needed services based upon individual needs.  The effect of family 
courts lends tentative support to the importance of individualized service planning that may 
depend upon community-based sanctions.  Comprehensive continuums of sanctions, 
however, rely upon local resources and collaboration among agencies within a community 
and between local communities that differ from one another in socioeconomic and possibly 
ideological ways.  As North Carolina and other states facilitate the development of 
community-based sanctions in local communities, planning efforts need to address 
implementation challenges, regional differences, and possible effects of ideology. 
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 Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics by geographic region
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Custody rate 12.24 11.69 16.65 14.57 6.99 7.78 13.02 10.34 11.04 6.79
Juvenile crime rate 49.38 33.27 54.78 39.00 32.67 19.08 52.93 30.68 66.59 31.13
Juvenile violent crime rate 34.11 33.59 34.54 29.02 17.55 15.98 44.40 32.71 52.30 53.32
Overall crime rate 57.89 29.23 66.49 34.79 42.69 20.06 60.59 23.73 64.72 26.00
Minority proportion of population 24.57 17.55 35.71 14.53 7.20 6.82 34.89 13.95 16.16 9.29
Youth proportion of population 10.64 1.08 11.10 0.93 9.84 0.93 11.03 1.15 10.58 0.45
Workfirst proportion of population 3.73 3.17 5.02 3.70 2.23 1.70 4.45 3.35 2.46 1.59
Female-headed household % of families 20.34 6.04 23.15 6.45 16.20 3.39 22.95 5.11 17.68 4.39
Percent change in minority population 9.11 11.57 4.41 5.84 13.71 17.35 9.50 7.23 10.47 7.54
Percent change in county population 7.87 6.70 6.01 7.39 6.88 3.94 10.89 7.75 9.74 5.36
Per capita income (in thousands) 21.42 5.26 20.34 44.49 20.85 46.26 22.01 6.08 24.54 56.73
Unemployment 5.67 2.40 5.96 1.97 5.79 2.88 5.74 2.52 4.53 1.60
Population density 164.75 201.77 105.82 134.28 127.16 112.17 192.68 202.28 356.79 337.82
Family court 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04
Public safety dollars per capita 130.57 68.89 132.18 90.27 136.35 63.71 125.62 47.42 121.98 39.14
Human service dollars per capita 194.35 103.65 205.00 103.26 170.19 75.91 219.14 137.38 177.16 71.23
Piedmont(n=203)Total (n=1557) East (n=538) West (n=459) Central(n=357) 
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 Total High Low Total High Low
Variables n=915 n=191 n=724 n=340 n=170 n=170
Juvenile crime rate per 1,000 youth 50.79 59.27 *** 48.55 52.47 58.08 ** 46.87
Juvenile violent crime rate per 10,000 youth 35.40 48.65 ** 31.90 34.78 39.44 ** 30.12
Overall crime rate per 1,000 people 60.54 64.52 * 59.49 61.26 64.89 * 57.62
Minority proportion of population 24.56 25.99 24.18 24.97 26.76 * 23.18
Youth proportion of population 10.61 10.71 10.58 10.70 10.72 10.68
Workfirst proportion of population 5.29 5.33 5.28 5.41 5.48 5.33
Female-headed household % of families 18.66 18.36 18.74 19.00 18.76 19.24
Percent change in minority population 10.74 8.31 ** 11.38 8.12 8.00 8.24
Percent change in county population 8.63 9.05 8.52 8.26 8.24 8.29
Per capita income (in thousands) 19.07 19.32 19.00 18.69 18.79 18.59
Unemployment 5.48 5.34 5.51 5.69 5.59 5.78
Population density 155.20 216.38 *** 139.06 165.02 172.33 157.72
Family court 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 * 0.04
Public safety dollars per capita 105.50 110.64 104.14 103.90 104.38 103.42
Human service dollars per capita 162.52 156.60 164.09 154.66 153.93 155.38
East 0.35 0.53 *** 0.30 0.47 0.53 * 0.41
West 0.29 0.21 ** 0.32 0.29 0.24 * 0.35
Central 0.23 0.05 *** 0.28 0.06 0.06 0.06
***p <.001   **p < .01   *p < .05 in two-tailed tests of significance
Table 4.2  Mean scores from pre-reform time period by implementation category  
Total sample Matched pairs sample
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Table 4.3  Logit model results for selection into high implementation group 
Variables  (n=91) Beta SE
Juvenile arrest rate -0.01 0.02
Minority proportion of population -0.05 0.06
Youth proportion of population 2.36 * 0.97
Growth in youth population 0.41 ** 0.14
Growth in county population -0.24 † 0.14
Growth in minority population -0.06 0.07
Proportion of families headed by single female -0.12 0.14
Population density 0.91 † 0.48
Per capita income (in thousands) -0.53 0.47
County revenue per 100 people 0.30 0.39
Human service funding per 100 people 1.57 * 0.80
Local school funding per 100 pupils 0.50 0.34
Public safety dollars per 100 people 1.86 0.00
East -1.24 1.96
West 1.09 1.58
Central -6.23 * 2.66
Democratic District Attorney 2.60 † 1.58
Proportion of voters registered as Democrats 0.03 0.05
LR Chi2 = 37.32**     Pseudo R2 = .426
Note.   To represent baseline levels, variables are averages of 1990-1991 data
**p < .01  *p < .05  †p < .10   
 Table 4.4  Correlation coefficients for crime variables and variables associated with minority percent 
                
Juvenile 
custody 
rate
Juvenile 
crime
Juvenile 
violent 
crime
Overall 
crime rate
Minority 
percent
Female-
headed 
household
Workfirst 
percent
Juvenile crime 0.39
Juvenile violent crime 0.31 0.69
Overall crime rate 0.40 0.79 0.44
Minority percent 0.30 0.24 0.34 0.36
Female-headed households 0.23 0.32 0.37 0.40 0.82
Workfirst percent 0.37 0.19 0.22 0.32 0.57 0.33
Youth percent 0.22 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.68 0.54 0.47
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 Variables
     Β      SE     Β       SE   Β   SE  Β     SE
High implementation indicator -3.07 * 1.28 -2.68 * 1.24 -1.76 1.24 -4.05 ** 1.47
Post reform indicator -2.23 ** 0.81 -3.18 ** 1.22 -2.91 * 1.21 -5.08 * 2.38
Immediate post reform indicator -2.98 ** 0.90 -2.85 ** 0.91 -2.96 ** 0.90 0.75 1.93
Post reform*High implementation indicator 1.06 1.24 1.15 1.23 0.33 1.23 0.47 1.89
Post reform*Immediate*High implementation 1.06 1.89 1.16 1.90 1.37 1.87 -1.13 2.76
Juvenile crime rate 0.08 *** 0.01 0.07 *** 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03
Minority proportion of population 0.09 * 0.04
Youth proportion of population 0.17 0.41 0.16 0.40 -0.98 0.72
Female-headed households 0.33 ** 0.11 0.33 ** 0.11 0.47 * 0.20
Workfirst proportion of population 0.33 * 0.15 0.31 * 0.15 0.48 0.27
Percent change in county population -0.15 * 0.07 -0.17 * 0.07 -0.16 * 0.07 -0.36 * 0.15
Percent change in minority population -0.07 * 0.03 -0.09 ** 0.03 -0.08 * 0.03 0.04 0.15
Percent change in youth population -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.07
Democratic proportion of voters -0.11 * 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.20 ** 0.07
Per capita income (in thousands) 0.34 * 0.17 0.29 0.16 0.33 * 0.16 0.22 0.30
Population density 0.32 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.27 0.32 -0.52 0.59
Unemployment -0.37 ** 0.14 -0.44 ** 0.15 -0.55 *** 0.15 -0.13 0.24
Eastern region 6.53 *** 1.790 7.13 *** 1.70 -4.70 2.74 9.09 *** 2.14
   *juvenile crime 0.19 *** 0.04
Central region 2.64 1.87 3.63 * 1.78 -4.61 2.85 0.51 3.53
   *juvenile crime 0.12 ** 0.04
Western region 1.23 1.72 0.41 1.64 -3.51 2.65 -0.72 2.34
   *juvenile crime 0.02 0.04
Family court district -2.62 * 1.24 -2.15 1.24 -2.56 * 1.23 -5.27 * 2.16
Public safety funding -0.57 0.64 -0.61 0.63 -1.04 0.62 -1.31 1.05
Human services funding 0.01 0.36 0.14 0.36 -0.01 0.3600 1.30 0.68
Note. 
 All analyses used random effects models that included a time trend variable and its square. 
*** p<.001  **p<.01  * p<.05
Table 4.5   Regression analysis predicting county-level juvenile custody rates                                                                                                                                                                                  
Matched sample                 
(n=571)   Full sample (n=1557)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Figure 4.1 National juvenile custody rates by race
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Figure 4.2  Juvenile custody rate trends in North Carolina   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
North Carolina legislation mandated policies to strengthen community-based sanctions as 
one key element in juvenile justice reform passed in 1998.  This study has shown that reform 
initiatives helped to reduce delinquency and decrease reliance on secure custody for juveniles.  
Availability of a broad spectrum of sanctions and services within a county helped to reduce 
county-level crime rates.  In particular, community-based residential programs had a large 
negative effect on both juvenile crime rates and secure custody rates.   Limitations of the study 
warrant caution in drawing conclusions.  Nonetheless, the results provide insight to improve 
continued policy development efforts that strengthen community-based sanctions for juveniles.   
Study Limitations 
Data and Measurement Issues 
Many of the challenges inherent in this study are related to available data and 
measurement issues.  Crime rates in this study were based upon official arrest statistics.  The use 
of official crime data is considered problematic in part because such data tend to underestimate 
crime and combine both criminal activity and system responses to crime (MacDonald, 2002).  
North Carolina does have county-level delinquency rates available to the public from court 
records, but the data begin at the peak of the juvenile crime trend in 1994 and likely would not 
provide an adequate baseline to examine changes.  In addition, court data also reflect differences 
in both delinquent behavior and system responses.  Self-reported delinquency measures are not 
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available at the county level.  These data limitations are common to all criminal justice 
researchers and should not prevent efforts to better understand and address delinquent behavior.   
Use of individual level data may have allowed greater precision in measurement 
regarding delinquent activity, but the underlying research question in this study identified the 
county as the most appropriate unit of analysis.  Individual behavioral change most likely occurs 
at the program level with specific services targeted to the needs and risk factors of individual 
youth.  Evaluation of those specific programs should involve individual level outcomes.  
Provision of appropriate services depends upon individual information and the availability of 
many sanctions options.  The comprehensiveness of a local sanctions continuum allows for 
individualized services to many delinquent youth.  Development of community-based sanctions 
is a county-level policy intervention intended to facilitate a general reduction in juvenile crime 
through varying programs and sanctions.  Despite the difficulties with an aggregate measure of 
crime using official data, county-level crime rates are appropriate measures given the particular 
focus of the policy intervention. 
Data limitations specific to this study are perhaps more problematic.  The lack of 
implementation data from seven counties prevented their inclusion in the study and limits 
generalization to the entire state.  Located in one part of the state, the counties tend to be smaller 
and less densely populated than the remaining 93 counties.  These differences may have affected 
the results.  Because North Carolina has such an expansive system of county government, 
sufficient observations were still available for analysis and conclusions could be drawn about the 
vast majority of the state. 
This study created quantitative measures of implementation to examine variability in 
sanctions across counties and then utilized the variability to examine the effects of sanctions on 
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policy outcomes.  The strategy raised two primary issues, the measurement of implementation 
and the threat of selection bias inherent in using differential implementation to distinguish 
between counties in terms of the level of policy intervention.  Many policy implementation 
studies are case studies that rely on qualitative methods to examine both the extent and predictors 
of implementation.  Without a clear guide to develop a quantitative policy implementation 
measure, this study relied upon models in school-based intervention research (Dusenbury, 
Brannigan, Falco, & Hansen, 2003; Hahn, Noland, Ravens, & Christie, 2002; Orthner, Akos, 
Charles, & Cooley, 2005; Tappe, 1995, 1997).  Many of the evaluations used additive indexes of 
intervention components, such as number of curriculum lessons taught, similar to the index of 
sanctions components used in this study.  Though sanctions components were designated as not 
available, partially available, or fully available, no attempt was made to further distinguish 
services within a sanctions component. Quality of programs was not considered, apart from the 
state’s ongoing efforts to ensure a minimum level of quality in program selection and retention.   
The state can help improve future evaluations of community-based sanctions through 
efforts to develop valid and reliable measures of implementation of community-based sanctions.  
The Standardized Program Evaluation Protocol provides a process for rating the quality of 
programs utilized within local sanctions continuums (Lipsey, Howell, & Tidd, 2008).  Continued 
use of this protocol can help improve implementation measures by incorporating aspects of both 
the quality and quantity of available programs to produce a more valid measure of 
implementation.  In addition, training the JCPC consultants regarding the local services 
assessment process can help provide more reliable measures of implementation across counties.  
Consultants should utilize similar standards for consideration of what services fall within a given 
program category and what constitutes availability or accessibility of programs.  The staff can 
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then facilitate the county-level decision-making processes to ensure each county is using similar 
rating criteria for the sanctions continuums.  Consistency across counties will improve the 
reliability of implementation measures.  The implementation measure should be improved, but 
the deliberate effort to measure and assess implementation variability represents progress beyond 
assumptions of uniformity in policy implementation. 
Selection Bias 
The variability that enabled comparisons between counties also introduced selection bias 
into the outcome evaluations.  Factors that influenced implementation also likely influenced 
crime rates and custody rates.  Various strategies were employed to address selection bias, but 
future research can also improve on these efforts and clarify relationships between economic 
resources, crime, and system responses to crime.  
Lessons Learned and Policy Implications 
 Despite the limitations, the study provides support for recent policy initiatives and offers 
insight for continued policy development.  North Carolina’s efforts to improve the juvenile 
justice system through the strengthening of community-based sanctions has contributed to 
reductions in juvenile crime and reduced reliance on secure custody for juvenile offenders.   The 
study confirms the recent legislative decision to continue funding the county-level Juvenile 
Crime Prevention Councils which coordinate the local sanctions continuums.  The study also 
provides empirical support for the decision to create smaller community-based residential 
programs rather than continue to rely solely on the larger, state-run secure Youth Development 
Centers.   
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Attitudes and Beliefs and Policy Implementation 
 Other findings offer insight about possible strategies for continued improvement of 
community-based sanctions.  Lessons for North Carolina offer insights for other states seeking to 
strengthen community-based sanctions.  The first and most obvious conclusion is that policy 
implementation matters.  Implementation of sanctions differed across counties, both in the 
overall level of available sanctions and in the availability of particular types of programs.  Such 
variability was not just related to deliberate discretionary choices based upon local needs.   
Several findings suggested that attitudes about crime and crime control may contribute to 
differential implementation.  The ideological stance, assessed by a broad measure of political 
party affiliation, of a key juvenile justice leader increased the level of overall implementation.  A 
Democratic leader also increased the likelihood that specific sanctions components would be 
fully available, but not all of them.  Regional effects contributed almost 20% of the explanation 
for variability in implementation.  Given multiple control variables representing socioeconomic 
differences between counties and regions, it seems likely that unobserved factors, such as belief 
systems or norms, were captured by regional indicators.  The custody rate study clearly showed 
that regions with the highest crime rates did not have correspondingly high incarceration rates, 
suggesting differential responses to crime based upon region.  Additional omitted variables may 
explain the differences, but multiple variables controlled for the biggest observed differences 
between regions. 
 If attitudes or belief systems affect policy outcomes, it seems important to encourage 
greater consensus among juvenile justice professionals and the public regarding effective 
strategies for crime control.  Staff trainings and technical assistance programs, across regions, 
provide opportunities to diffuse information about evidence-based practice to juvenile justice 
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professionals.  Such situations may also provide opportunities to assess differential attitudes and 
engage in discussion to facilitate consensus.  The state plan to build community-based residential 
facilitates also provides opportunities to engage with the public in various local communities 
regarding the evidence base supporting the policy decisions.  
Resources and Policy Implementation 
 Though the evidence is not as conclusive, results of this analysis also suggested that 
funding and economic resources may contribute to low availability of community-based 
sanctions.  Bivariate analysis showed that counties with fewer financial resources tended to have 
fewer sanctions alternatives.  Other variables may mediate these effects.  Many of the 
socioeconomic variables had insignificant effects on crime or custody rates when selection 
effects were controlled, suggesting a relationship between those variables and implementation.  
In multivariate analysis, state funding for JCPCs was associated with decreased implementation 
levels.  More densely populated counties tended to have higher levels of implementation.   
In order to better understand the relationship between state funding and local resources 
and implementation, it will be important to examine the funding stream for various local 
programs, the state funding formula to determine allocations to local communities, and the 
disbursement of state funding within a county.  The existing process with three different levels of 
required matches for state funding acknowledge that counties have varying resources with which 
to respond to state mandates.  The designations for match requirements should be updated.  In 
addition, it may be helpful to establish smaller categories of funding designated for particular 
sanctions components or programs that are lacking.  Particular challenges to implementation, 
such as transportation in less densely populated areas, could also be addressed through specific 
funding.  Conflict within local counties for limited resources from the state may affect 
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implementation.  State efforts to encourage innovative, evidence-based, collaborative programs 
may reduce reliance on state funding and build consensus within a local community.    
Policy Components 
 Finally, greater awareness of how the different components of juvenile justice reform 
work together may strengthen the juvenile justice system.  The underlying strategy of graduated 
sanctions is to provide targeted sanctions and services to youth based upon individualized needs 
and risk of recidivism (Wilson & Howell, 1993).  Individualized responses require both 
information specific to an offender and an array of sanctions alternatives.  This study has focused 
on the latter.  North Carolina assesses 98% of all delinquent youth using risk and needs 
assessment tools, and all local crime councils receive the aggregated information about youth in 
their local communities.  The information alone is insufficient to ensure appropriate provision of 
services to individual youth.  This study has shown that lower levels of available services do 
affect juvenile crime rates.  The process of matching youth needs to available services is a 
necessary step toward crime reduction that involves the interplay of knowledge about youth and 
knowledge about community-based sanctions alternatives provided by a multitude of agencies.  
The Juvenile Crime Prevention Councils are one mechanism to facilitate the matching process.  
Though not the focus of this study, counties with family courts showed reductions in juvenile 
crime and secure custody rates.  Family courts may represent another strategy to facilitate 
individualized service planning for delinquent youth.  Greater understanding of organizational 
processes and the decision-making behavior of key actors will illuminate ways to facilitate not 
only the necessary provision of services but the matching of appropriate services to individual 
youth.  
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 North Carolina serves as an example of a state utilizing evidence-based practice 
principles to strengthen the juvenile justice system.  This study validates efforts to strengthen 
community-based sanctions in order to reduce juvenile crime.  In addition, the shift toward 
smaller community-based residential programs holds promise for effectively addressing juvenile 
crime and reducing secure custody rates.  Policy efforts will be strengthened by addressing 
attitudinal differences about appropriate system responses to delinquent youth.  Re-examination 
of funding formulas and disbursement practices may help ensure sufficient resources to provide a 
wide array of sanctions options.  Greater clarity about the process used to match individual youth 
with appropriate services and sanctions can help ensure the greatest likelihood of behavioral 
change.  Recent increases in juvenile crime nationally and the prospect of further increases due 
to an economic recession underscore the importance of research to determine effective 
approaches to address delinquency.  Effective crime control strategies rely upon the full 
implementation of community-based sanctions continuums.   
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  All  Missing Sample 
(n=100) (n=7) (n=93)
Total population (in thousands) 85.39 74.68 86.19
Per capita income (in thousands) 25.58 25.36 25.83
Population density 175.20 125.06 179.11
Youth proportion of population 0.11 0.11 0.11
Minority proportion of population 0.24 0.23 0.26
Democratic proportion of registered voters 0.52 0.49 0.52
Delinquency rate 2004 35.60 31.70 35.80
Appendix B  Mean differences between counties missing from 
sample, in sample, and total counties
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Appendix C  Diagnostics to assess common support for matching procedure 
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Minimum -2.72 -12.85
25th percentile -1.45 -5.27
Median 0.69 -3.43
75th percentile 1.77 -1.94
Maximum 6.81 0.78
Mean 0.70 -3.91
Standard Deviation 2.39 2.92
Implementation group
Summary statistics for log odds ratios
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  Appendix D  Mean differences in matched pairs sample for implementation groups 
                       by quartiles based on propensity scores
Variables  (n=34) High Low High Low High Low High Low
(n=4) (n=5) (n=2) (n=6) (n=4) (n=5) (n=7) (n=1)
Juvenile arrest rate 36.50 38.20 41.00 47.80 41.50 45.20 62.43 26.00
Minority proportion of population 0.20 0.14 0.37 0.36 0.22 0.21 0.02 0.25
Youth proportion of population 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09
Growth in youth population -0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.14
Growth in county population 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13
Growth in minority population 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.11
Proportion of families headed by single female 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.13
Population density 137.55 159.68 94.59 115.68 232.60 185.12 154.61 460.75
Per capita income (in thousands) 15.22 16.92 15.25 14.87 14.49 14.53 16.04 14.55
County revenue per 100 people 4.96 6.32 5.43 4.56 5.44 6.39 8.45 7.22
Human service funding per 100 people 1.14 1.09 1.09 1.16 1.14 1.02 1.63 1.00
Local school funding per 100 pupils 7.81 9.87 6.54 7.32 7.35 7.83 10.86 8.72
Public safety dollars per 100 people 0.73 0.63 0.54 0.55 0.59 0.74 0.96 0.79
East 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.25 0.60 0.71 1.00
West 0.50 0.60 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.00
Central 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00
Democratic District Attorney 0.75 0.40 1.00 0.83 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00
Proportion of voters registered as Democrats 0.64 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.70 0.66 0.74 0.53
Propensity score 0.12 0.12 0.27 0.32 0.57 0.50 0.83 0.70
Note.   To represent baseline levels, variables are averages of 1990-1991 data
Note.   When possible, t-tests were conducted and no significant differences between means were found,      
           perhaps due to small sample size
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
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